Civil Law Aspects of
Missing persons
(LRC CP 64 - 2011)
© Copyright
Law Reform Commission
FIRST PUBLISHED
December 2011
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Legal
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Kate Clancy, LLB (Hons) (TCD)
Conor Cunningham BCL (Clinical)
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Dannie Hanna BCL (NUI), LLM
(Cantab)
Donna Lyons LLB (Dub), LLM (NYU),
Attorney at Law (NY)
Tara Murphy BCL (Law with French
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Aoife Clarke BA
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Barbara Brown
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Rachel Kemp BCL
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Clerical Officers:
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Dargan
Principal legal researcher for this CONSULTATION
PAPER
Dannie Hanna BCL (NUI), LLM
(Cantab)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The
Commission would like to thank the following people who provided valuable
assistance:
Fr. Aquinas Duffy, Founder, Missing Persons
Association
Dr. Brian Farrell, Dublin City Coroner
Superintendent Fergus Healy, Garda Missing Persons
Bureau
Mr Edo Korljan, Secretary, Committee of Experts on
Family Law (CJ-FA), Council of Europe
Mr Eoin O’Shea, Helpline Co-ordinator, Missing
Persons Helpline
Full
responsibility for this publication lies, however, with the Commission.
Table of Legislation xi
Table of Cases xiii
A Civil Law Aspects of Missing Persons
B Statistics on Missing Persons in Ireland
C Why People Go Missing and Scope of the Consultation
Paper
D Impact on Those Left Behind and Limits of Current
Law
E Outline of Consultation Paper
CHAPTER
1 categorising
missing persons for civil law purposes
B Defining a missing person for civil law purposes
C The Current Law in Ireland on Missing Persons
(1) Section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962
(2) Common law presumption of life up to 7 years and
presumption of death after 7 years
D International and Comparative Analysis
(1) 1950 UN Convention on Missing Persons in World War
II
(2) 2009 Council of Europe Recommendation on Missing
Persons
(3) The approach in Civil Law and Common Law countries
to Missing Persons
(4) Northern Ireland and Scotland
E Conclusions and Provisional Recommendations
(1) Categorising missing persons in connection with
presumed death
(2) Missing persons and interim administration
procedures
CHAPTER
2 INTERIM
ADMINISTRATION of A Missing Person’s PROPERTY
B Australian Legislation on Interim Administration
(1) When can an application be made?
(3) How is an application made?
(4) What can an administrator do?
C Canadian Legislation on Interim Administration
D Conclusions and Provisional Recommendations
(1) When can an application be made?
(2) Who can make an application to be appointed as an
administrator?
(3) What can an administrator do?
CHAPTER
3 PRESUMPTION
OF DEATH LEGISLATION
B The Limited Nature of Existing Law
C Conclusions and Provisional Recommendations
(1) Where death is virtually certain.
(2) Where death is highly probable
(3) Retaining the 7 year reference period where death is
highly probable
(4) Persons who may apply for a declaration of presumed
death
(5) The status of marriage or civil partnership
CHAPTER
4 When
the missing person returns and international aspects of missing persons
B Property of the Missing Person Who Returns:
Variation Order
C Marriage or Civil Partnership of the Missing Person
Who Returns
D International Aspects of Missing Persons
(1) Where an Irish citizen disappears abroad
(2) Where a person from abroad disappears in Ireland
CHAPTER
5 SUMMARY
OF PROVISIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
|
|
|
c. A.3 |
Can |
|
Bigamy Act 1603 |
11 Jac.1, c. 1 |
Eng |
Cestui Que Vie Act 1666 |
18 & 19 Cha 2, c. 11 |
Eng |
Civil Partnership Act 2004 |
c. 33 |
Eng |
Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 |
24/2010 |
Irl |
Coroners Act 1962 |
9/1962 |
Irl |
Coroners Act 1988 |
c. 13 |
Eng |
Declarations of Death Act 2002 |
c. 14 |
Can |
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 |
No. 58/1986 |
Aus |
Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 |
27/2009 |
Irl |
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 |
c. 18 |
Eng |
Missing Persons and Presumption of Death Act 2009 |
c. M-20.01 |
Can |
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 |
24 & 25 Vict, c. 100 |
Eng |
Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977 |
c. 27 |
Scot |
Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009 |
c. 6 |
NI |
Social Security Act 1998 |
c. 14 |
Eng |
Social Security Administration Act 1992 |
c. 5 |
Eng |
Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 |
26/2005 |
Irl |
Succession Act 1965 |
27/1965 |
Irl |
Survivorship and Presumption of Death Act 1996 |
c. 444 |
Can |
Verschollenheitsgesetz 1939 |
401-6 |
Ger |
TABLE OF CASES
|
|
|
In re Adoption (No.2) Bill 1987 |
[1989] IR 656 |
Irl |
[1937] 59 CLR 395 |
Aus |
|
Re Bennett |
[2006] QSC 250 |
Aus |
Re Burgess |
[2004] BCJ No. 73 |
Can |
Chard v Chard |
[1956] P 259 |
Eng |
Comey v Manufacturing Life Insurance Co. |
[2010] AJ No. 1008 |
Can |
Re Cyr |
[2006] BCJ No. 2703 |
Can |
Re Doherty |
[1961] IR 219 |
Irl |
In the Goods of Freytag |
(1909) 42 ILTR 116 |
Irl |
Re Hills |
[2009] SASC 176 |
Aus |
Kamboj v Kamboj |
(2007) CanLII 14932 |
Can |
Kotai v Queen of North (The) |
[2007] BCJ No. 1573 |
Can |
McMahon and Ors v McElroy |
(1869) IR 5 Eq 1 |
Irl |
Re Quang Lu |
(2008) Ont SC |
Can |
Rosewall (Guardianship) |
[2010] VCAT 1994 |
Aus |
Sherman v National Life Assurance Co. of Canada |
[1996] 92 OAC 19 |
Can |
The State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála |
[1966] IR 567 |
Irl |
Re Vos Estate |
[2008] ABQB 487 |
Can |
Re Watkins |
[1953] 1 WLR 1323 |
Eng |
1.
This Consultation Paper forms part of the Commission’s Third
Programme of Law Reform 2008-14[1] and examines
the civil law aspects that arise when a person goes missing.[2]
The main feature of current law in this area is that there is a presumption
that a missing person is alive for up to 7 years, and that a presumption of
death applies after 7 years. These presumptions may be rebutted by contrary
evidence, so that a person can be presumed dead where they have been missing
for less than 7 years; and an absence of 7 years does not always lead to a
declaration of presumed death.
2.
In the Consultation Paper the Commission examines how the existing law
in this area deals with, for example, succession rights of family members, payment of any life insurance policy and the ongoing legal
status of a marriage or civil partnership. The Consultation Paper also deals
with the precise circumstances in which a declaration of “presumed death” (in
some countries, also referred to as a declaration of “death in absentia”)
may be issued before or after 7 years have elapsed. The Commission also
examines the effect that long absence (or a declaration of presumed death) has
for the civil status of a missing person. This is especially important if he or
she returns after a long time; in turn, this raises civil status questions such
as whether his or her marriage remains valid, whether parental responsibilities
to any children remain in place and whether any dealings with his or her
property during his or her absence should stand.
3.
In the Consultation Paper, the Commission also examines some immediate
practical problems for family members – often referred to as those left behind
– such as how to access a missing person’s bank account (especially where the
bank account is in his or her sole name) so that bills can be paid. As
discussed in the Consultation Paper, the Commission notes that this area needs
to be dealt with separately from the question of presumed death.
4.
In Ireland, as set out in the Table below, the Garda Síochána Missing
Persons Bureau notes that on average almost 20 people are reported missing
every day, that is, between 7,000 and 8,000 annually.
Table: Missing Persons in Ireland 2003-2010[3]
Year |
Number of Reports |
Number still Missing |
2010 |
8,339 |
28 |
2009 |
7,749 |
66 |
2008 |
7,980 |
39 |
2007 |
7,992 |
52 |
2006 |
6,811 |
53 |
2005 |
5,997 |
34 |
2004 |
5,060 |
51 |
2003 |
3,987 |
58 |
Total |
53,915 |
381 |
5.
In 2009, the Garda Síochána Inspectorate noted that, of this total,
young persons in contact with the Health Service Executive (HSE) account for
43% of all missing persons reports filed with the Garda Síochána, but represent
only 8% of persons reported missing. The Garda Síochána Inspectorate concluded
that this indicated that “many were reported missing on multiple occasions,
including one child who was reported missing 169 times.”[4]
It is important to note, however, as the Table also indicates, that the
overwhelming majority of missing persons, including young persons in contact
with the HSE, are located within a short time.
6.
Thus, in the 8 year period from 2003 to 2010 covered by these figures,
out of a total of 53,915 persons reported missing, 381 remained
missing at the time of writing (November 2011), that is, about 0.7% of the
total.[5]
These figures are consistent with the statistics collated by the Irish Missing
Persons Helpline, which indicate that 95% of missing persons are found within
“a short period of time.”[6] This is also
reflected in similar statistics internationally. For example, in Australia, 90%
of missing persons are found within 2 weeks, rising to 98% within 6 months.[7]
It is clear therefore that in Ireland, as in many other countries, only a small
percentage of missing person cases remain unsolved in the sense that the vast
majority of missing persons turn up within a short time.
7.
Persons from all ages and walks of life go missing in many different
circumstances and for different reasons.[8] As the Garda Síochána Inspectorate has noted, young persons
in the care of the Health Service Executive (HSE) account for 43% of all
missing persons reports filed with the Garda Síochána, but represent only 8% of
persons reported missing. The position of missing children generally is quite
different from adult missing persons, and aside from those who come to the
attention of the HSE, children go missing primarily because of abduction,
whether by family members or others. The Commission is conscious that where
children go missing this gives rise to specific issues for those left behind,
including for example how to deal with the person who has abducted the child.
This issue, which often has an international and trans-border aspect, is
largely outside the scope of this project.[9]
8.
By contrast with children, adults who go missing often do so
voluntarily: they may simply wish to break contact with family or friends,
which can sometimes be connected with emotional issues. Another major reason is
financial difficulties such as personal debt, and the missing person may
consider that a sudden disappearance will facilitate leaving the debt behind.
Another small group of people go missing due to memory loss sustained in a fall
or traffic accident: some are located through established missing persons bureaus or through media coverage, as in the case of
the missing Irishman John Delaney.[10]
9.
In other instances, the circumstances of the person’s disappearance
indicate that he or she has committed suicide but the body has not been found.
In a small number of extreme cases, of course, the missing person may wish to
use his or her disappearance to personal advantage, by being able to make a
claim on, for example, a life insurance policy. There are well-known examples
of where this has been accompanied by leaving evidence of what turns out to be
a faked suicide. These instances pose clear difficulties for those left behind,
and for an insurance company that must decide whether to make a payment under
the life policy. In some instances, of course, this includes the need to
determine whether a missing person has committed suicide or whether the
circumstances indicate an attempt to defraud. This was the position in the
disappearance in 1974 of the English MP John Stonehouse and, in 2002, of
Englishman John Darwin.[11]
10.
Another group of missing adults are those who disappear where the
circumstances indicate they have been abducted and killed, an example being the
disappearance in 1986 of the English estate agent Suzy Lamplugh.[12]
In Ireland, during the violence associated with Northern Ireland between the
1970s and late 1990s, a number of people were abducted but have not been found:
they are often referred to as “the Disappeared”. While the number of persons
involved is small,[13] the
Commission acknowledges that this group of missing persons merit specific
recognition in any reform proposals.[14]
11.
This Consultation Paper is primarily concerned with missing adults
because these cases are more likely to raise the specific issues that require
civil law resolution: how to deal with a missing person’s bank accounts or
investments; whether payment should be made under a life insurance policy;
whether those left behind may apply for administration of the missing person’s
estate on the basis that he or she is presumed dead; and the civil status of
those left behind (for example, whether they are free to remarry).
12.
Regardless of the circumstances of a disappearance or the period of
absence of the missing person, the impact on those left behind, family members
in particular, cannot be understated. As the disappearance of a person is often
unanticipated and unexpected, the emotional trauma caused by the disappearance
can be devastating for those left behind. The mother of a missing teenager in
England stated: “There is no preparation, no luxury of hindsight for dealing
with the loss of a loved one. You are thrown into an alien world.”[15]
13.
The emotional impact on those left behind can be directly attributed to
the lack of information that occurs when a person goes missing.[16]
Therefore, in place of certainty, those left behind are forced to deal with the
“ambiguous loss”[17] of the
person. In attempting to cope with this uncertainty, those left behind often
feel stuck or “frozen” in time. This is a normal human response to having a
loved one disappear. As the figures mentioned above indicate, in most
situations where a person goes missing, those left behind will, within a short
time, know what has happened, in particular whether the missing person is alive
or dead. For the small minority where the person does not turn up, the concept
of “missing” occupies an emotional space where those left behind have no
absolutes.[18]
14.
The Commission accepts that the law should, as far as is practicable, be
responsive to the complexity of the consequences that arise when an adult goes
missing; and that the current law does not meet this standard. In Ireland, there
is no generally applicable law concerning the civil law of missing persons. The
current law is confined to: (a) a limited reference to missing persons in the Coroners
Act 1962 and (b) the common law presumption of life up to 7 years, and a
corresponding presumption of death after 7 years (both presumptions being
rebuttable).
15.
Section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962 provides for an inquest to be
held where a coroner believes
that the person’s body was, for example, lost at sea or destroyed in a
fire; such an inquest can lead to a declaration of death and the consequent
issuing of a death certificate. The 1962 Act does not, however, provide for an
inquest in respect of missing persons in general terms; most inquests require
the presence of the deceased’s body.
16.
More significantly, the common law presumption of life up to 7 years and
presumption of death after 7 years allows those left behind to apply to the High Court to have a
declaration of presumed death after 7 years, and this may be shortened if it is
reasonable to conclude that the person is already dead. As discussed in the
Consultation Paper, this declaration of presumed death is limited to allowing
the deceased’s estate to be administered by an executor. It does not have the
effect in law of a death certificate, and therefore it does not, for example,
have any effect on any marriage or civil partnership. The Commission notes in
the Consultation Paper that this 7 year rule has been recognised in specific,
limited, circumstances such as in section 18 of the Land and Conveyancing
Law Reform Act 2009 in connection with beneficiaries under a trust
concerning land who are missing.[19]
17.
The Commission also
notes that, irrespective of whether the missing person returns, those
left behind are faced with immediate practical problems, such as how to deal
with mortgage payments, access to bank accounts that might become overdrawn, or
insurance renewal on a car or motorbike. One mother of a missing person in
England stated: “I didn’t want my son’s account to go overdrawn. It mattered so
much to me.”[20] The existing law does not facilitate
immediate access to, for example, the missing person’s bank accounts because,
in the immediate aftermath of a disappearance, it will be difficult to
establish that the circumstances indicate any probability that the person is
unlikely to return, so that the common law presumption of life will be
difficult to rebut.
18.
It is clear, therefore, that in the absence of a comprehensive set of
legislative provisions that deal with all civil law aspects of missing persons,
those left behind face legal and practical problems which can increase the
emotional trauma they experience. The Commission accepts that reform of the
civil law aspects of missing persons may go some way to alleviate the emotional
impact for those left behind, while at the same time protecting the legitimate
claims of a missing person who later returns.
19.
The Commission now
turns to outline the contents of the Consultation Paper.
20.
In Chapter 1 the
Commission examines how the various ways in which people go missing can
suitably be categorised with a view to developing a clear legislative framework
to deal with the practical civil law issues that fall within the scope of this
Consultation Paper. The Commission has provisionally concluded that, for the
purposes of a declaration of presumed death, there are two main categories. The
first category, where the circumstances of their disappearance indicates that
death is virtually certain, would deal with persons who go missing in
circumstances (whether arising from a civil accident or arising from a violent
incident) where their death is virtually certain given the circumstances. The
second category, where the circumstances of their disappearance, and its
length, indicates that it is highly probable that they have died and will not
return, would apply where the disappearance occurred
in dangerous circumstances or in other circumstances in which loss of life may
be presumed.
21.
The Commission
provisionally recommends that, in determining whether a presumption of death is
to be ordered, all the circumstances surrounding the disappearance must be
taken into account, including the following: (a) the time, location, and
circumstances of the disappearance, (b) the extent and nature of
post-disappearance searches, (c) a prior history of fraud, (d) the presence or
absence of a motive for the missing person to remain alive but disappear, (e)
the time between a life insurance policy being obtained and the subsequent
disappearance, (f) facts suggesting the disappearance was a consequence of foul
play, and (g) abandonment of valuable property.
22.
The Commission also
provisionally recommends that separate arrangements should be put in place to
deal with the interim administration of the property of a missing person, in
particular where it is not clear whether the person will return. This would
deal with the immediate and practical issues already mentioned.
23.
In Chapter 2, the
Commission examines how a proposed legislative framework could provide for the
practical day-to-day issues (such as bill-paying from the missing person’s bank
account) that arise when a person remains absent for a relatively short period
of time but where those left behind should be in a position to take relevant,
limited, action to administer and manage the assets of the missing person. The
Commission examines in this respect legislation in place in Australia and
Canada that permits a limited and specific use of the property of missing
persons, building on the existing structure of their adult guardianship
legislation. Arrangements that might be put in place in that context could
include the appointment of an interim administrator of the missing person’s
property (who could be a family member). Such an arrangement would not have an
impact on the civil law status of the missing person (for example their status
as living) or of those left behind (for example, married). Pending the
enactment of modern adult guardianship in Ireland, the Commission concludes
that such applications could be made to the Probate Office of the High Court.
24.
In Chapter 3, the
Commission discusses the details of the proposed presumption of death
legislation recommended in Chapter 1. This includes an analysis of comparable
laws in other countries, including the Presumption of Death (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009. The application of legislation concerning presumed death
involves a change in civil status for the missing person and the consequences
that flow from this (such as administration of the estate and consequential
effects for insurance purposes).
25.
The Commission draws
important distinctions between the procedures that it envisages would be
involved in obtaining a declaration of presumed death, depending on the category
of missing person involved. In the case of a missing person where the
circumstances indicate that death is virtually certain, the Commission
considers that an application could be made to a coroner; this would build on
the, admittedly limited, powers already contained in the Coroners Act 1962
to hold an inquest involving a missing person. On the other hand, where the
circumstances indicate that death is highly probable, the Commission considers
that an application should be made to the High Court, as is the case at
present.
26.
In Chapter 4, the
Commission discusses the consequences of the return of a missing person in
respect of whom either the interim arrangements discussed in Chapter 2 have
been applied or in respect of whom a declaration of presumption of death has
been made in accordance with the proposals in Chapter 3. The Commission also
discusses the international dimension, where persons go missing outside Ireland
and also where non-Irish nationals go missing in Ireland. This also includes
discussion of specific provisions to recognise the Disappeared, those
associated with the violence in Northern Ireland between the 1970s and the late
1990s.
27.
Chapter 5 contains a
summary of the provisional recommendations made in this Consultation Paper.
28.
This Consultation Paper is intended to form the basis of discussion and
therefore all the recommendations are provisional in nature. The Commission
will make its final recommendations on the subject of the civil law aspects of
missing persons following further consideration of the issues and consultation.
Submissions on the provisional recommendations included in this Consultation
Paper are welcome. To enable the Commission to proceed with the preparation of
the Report, which will contain the Commission’s final recommendations in this area, those who wish to do so are requested to make their
submissions in writing to the Commission or by email to info@lawreform.ie by 31
March 2012.
1
1.01
In this Chapter, the Commission begins in Part B by examining the
circumstances in which people go missing in order to arrive at a general
definition of missing persons for the purposes of the civil law, which is the
focus of this Consultation Paper. In Part C, the Commission outlines the
current law in Ireland concerning missing persons, which primarily concerns the
circumstances in which the missing person is either presumed to be alive or
presumed dead. The Commission then examines in Part D international and
comparative developments in this area. In the context of the presumption of
death, the Commission notes the importance of the 2009 Council of Europe
Recommendation on Missing Persons which provides a general framework around
which the law on presumption of death may be reformed. The Commission also
notes that many countries have, in addition to enacting legislation on presumption
of death, put in place specific provisions to deal with interim financial
issues for those left behind, such as limited administration of the missing
person’s assets and estate. These provisions operate quite separately from the
question of presumption of death. In Part E, the Commission
sets out its conclusions and provisional recommendations for reform on the
question of presumption of death and the separate issue of interim measures to
administer the estate and assets of the missing person.
1.02
The focus of this Consultation Paper is the civil law aspects of missing
persons, and in this Part the Commission examines the circumstances in which
people disappear in order to arrive at a general definition of missing persons.
As already noted in the Introduction to this Consultation Paper, there are many
reasons why people go missing, or disappear. Where the circumstances are
unexpected or unusual, it is often unclear precisely what has happened,
although as the figures referred to in the Introduction indicate, over 99% of
people reported missing will turn up alive within a short time. As for the
remaining small number of long-term missing, their family and friends will often
retain the hope that, even where there has been no contact or word for many
years, the missing person is still alive and may return.
1.03
This hope is actually grounded in reality, because the general literature on adult missing persons
notes that, in a substantial minority of such cases, the person may have
“simply drifted away” and subsequently had “no desire to renew contact” with
those previously associated with them.[21] These people
may be alive for many years, may never return home but may have assets which
need to be administered at some stage. The High Court decision in Re Doherty[22]
is an example of this, where the State (with the assistance of the missing
person’s stockbrokers) applied to have him declared presumed dead after 42
years absence.
1.04
There have also been
instances where a person goes missing, is presumed dead, but who later turns up
or is found. For example, John Delaney was an Irish person who, while
living in England, went missing. His family, after numerous efforts to locate
him, were told that his remains had been discovered, and they had them
cremated. John Delaney’s son subsequently discovered, while watching a
television documentary on unidentified missing persons in England,
that his father had suffered a head injury which resulted in a loss of
memory and he had ended up in a nursing home and was still alive.[23]
1.05
As for missing
children, there have also been a number of high-profile cases
internationally of children who have gone missing and who have been found many
years later, such as the American Jaycee Lee Dugard and the Austrian Natascha
Kampusch. For many families and friends, therefore, “missing” does not in any
sense equate with being “presumed dead”. The case of the young English girl
Madeline McCann who disappeared in Portugal in 2007 and was assumed abducted is
an example of a case where her parents continue to believe that she, too, will
one day be found.
1.06
In other instances involving an adult who disappears, the circumstances
of the person’s disappearance indicate that he or she has committed suicide but
the body has not been found. In a small number of extreme cases, of course, the
missing person may wish to use his or her disappearance to personal advantage,
by being able to make a claim on, for example, a life insurance policy. There
are well-known examples of where this has been accompanied by leaving evidence
of what turns out to be a faked suicide. These instances pose clear
difficulties for those left behind, and for an insurance company that must
decide whether to make a payment under the life policy. In some instances, of
course, this includes the need to determine whether a missing person has
committed suicide or whether the circumstances indicate an attempt to defraud.
1.07
This was the situation in the disappearance in 1974 of the English MP
John Stonehouse, who had faked his suicide in order to avoid regulatory
investigations into his businesses and other personal financial problems. He
had also taken out a life insurance policy shortly before his disappearance in
order to benefit his wife (who was unaware of his plans, and who never made a
claim on the policy). He was later found in Australia and deported to England,
where he was convicted of attempting to obtain money by false pretences.[24]
Similarly, in March 2002 the Englishman John Darwin disappeared while canoeing,
and appeared at the time to have drowned. His wife had reported him missing
and, in April 2003, an inquest into his disappearance[25] recorded an open verdict, and a death certificate was
issued. Arising from this, Mrs Darwin successfully made claims totalling
£250,000 on a life insurance policy and a mortgage protection policy on their
family home. In 2007, John Darwin entered a police station in London claiming
he had suffered from amnesia for the previous 5 years. After further
investigations, he and his wife were later convicted of conspiracy to defraud.[26]
1.08
There have also, of course, many equally highly-publicised cases where a
disappearance has been followed by an extensive but fruitless search for the
missing person, leading ultimately to an acceptance that he or she has died.
For example, in 1986 an English estate agent, Suzy Lamplugh, disappeared after
she went to meet an unknown client. Her body was never found but it was
eventually accepted that she had been killed. In 1993, her parents accepted
that, 7 years after her disappearance, they should apply to the English courts for
a declaration that she was “presumed dead”[27]
and the English High Court made a presumed dead declaration in 1994. This is an
example of applying the long-established rule of presumed death after 7 years
which, as discussed below, also applies in Ireland.
1.09
Major civil accidents have also resulted in the death and disappearance
of many people. In 2009, an Air France plane crashed into the Atlantic off the
coast of Brazil en route to Paris; it is generally accepted that all 228
persons on board died (three of whom were Irish), but that over 70 bodies will
never be recovered. The 1977 collision between two planes on the ground in
Tenerife (Canary Islands) also led to the virtual impossibility of identifying
some of the remains of those who had boarded.
1.10
The outcome in terms of missing persons in such civil accidents is also
reflected in terrorist-type attacks, such as the “9/11” attack on the Twin
Towers of the New York World Trade Centre in 2001.[28]
It is clear that thousands of people died in the attack on 11 September 2001,
and many of them were identified, some from extremely limited remains using the
most-recent advances in DNA identification techniques. Nonetheless, many people
who died in the 9/11 attack will never be identified, but a number have since
been declared presumed dead under New York law. In Ireland, the violence
connected with Northern Ireland between the 1970s and late 1990s led to a
particular category of missing persons known as “the Disappeared”. This group
of missing people are assumed to have been kidnapped by paramilitary groups and
murdered, in circumstances where their bodies were hidden. At the time of
writing (November 2011), seven of “the Disappeared” have yet to be found.
1.11
The definition of a missing person should, therefore, be sufficiently
broad to include the varying circumstances in which persons may go missing.
This should include cases of persons who simply choose to break contact with
their family and close friends, as well as where the person has gone missing in
circumstances which indicate that death is a probability. The definition must
also be sufficiently sensitive to those left behind. As previously
noted, “missing” should not necessarily be equated with “presumed dead.”
1.12
It is therefore useful to note firstly that a missing person is a person
whose whereabouts are unknown to those left behind. In this respect, a missing
person is:[29]
“someone who is absent from their accustomed network of social
and personal relationships to the extent that people within that network define
the absence as interfering with the performance by that person of expected
social responsibilities, leading to a situation in which members of the network
feel obliged to search for the missing person and may institute official
procedures to identify the person as missing.”
1.13
Cohen, McCormick and Plecas summarise this succinctly:[30]
“In other words, missing people
are those observed to be missing from their normal patterns of life.”
1.14
A second important element is that, as there is often an absence
of information regarding the missing person, it is natural that those left
behind have fears for the safety and well-being of the missing person. Thus,
James, Anderson and Putt note that, from a law enforcement perspective, a
missing person can be defined as:
“someone whose whereabouts is unknown,
and there are serious concerns for their safety and welfare.”[31]
1.15
This view is echoed by the English Association of Chief Police Officers
who define a missing person as:
“anyone
whose whereabouts is unknown whatever the circumstances of disappearance. They
will be considered missing until located and their well-being or otherwise
established.”[32]
1.16
Having regard to this overview, the Commission has therefore concluded
that, in the context of any legislative framework concerning the civil law
status of missing persons, a missing person should be defined as a person who
is observed to be missing from their normal patterns of life, that those who
are likely to have heard from them are unaware of their whereabouts and that
the circumstances of their being missing raises concerns for their safety and
well-being.
1.17
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in the context of any
legislative framework concerning the civil law status of missing persons, a
missing person should be defined as a person who is observed to be missing from
their normal patterns of life, that those who are likely to have heard from
them are unaware of their whereabouts and that the circumstances of their being
missing raises concerns for their safety and well-being.
1.18
In this Part, the Commission outlines the current law in Ireland
concerning missing persons, which primarily concerns the circumstances in which
the missing person is either presumed to be alive or presumed dead. There is
currently no generally applicable law concerning the civil law of missing
persons. The current law is confined to: (a) a limited reference to missing
persons in the Coroners Act 1962, and (b) the common law
presumption of life up to 7 years, and a corresponding presumption of death
after 7 years (both presumptions being rebuttable). This common law 7 year rule has been recognised
in specific, limited, circumstances such as in section 18 of the Land and
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 in connection with beneficiaries under a
trust concerning land who are missing.
1.19
Section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962 provides:
“Whenever a
coroner has reason to believe that a death has occurred in or near his district
in such circumstances that an inquest is appropriate and that, owing to the
destruction of the body or its being irrecoverable, an inquest cannot be held
except by virtue of this section, the Minister may, if he so thinks proper, direct
an inquest in relation to the death to be held by that coroner or another
coroner, and thereupon the coroner so directed shall hold an inquest in
relation to the death in like manner as if the body were lying within his
district and had been viewed by him.”
1.20
Section 23 of the 1962 Act thus provides for an inquest to be held where
a coroner believes that “a
death has occurred” in circumstances that indicate an inquest is appropriate,
but where, because the body has been destroyed or is irrecoverable, it would
not be possible to hold an inquest but for the provisions of section 23 itself.
This refers to the fact that, in general, inquests require the presence
of the deceased’s body, whereas section 23 of the 1962 Act is a clear exception
to this. Section 23 also provides that such an inquest can only be held by a
coroner where the Minister for Justice issues a direction to do so.
1.21
The Commission understands that, while section 23 of the 1962 Act has
not been used on many occasions, it has been used in cases where a body has
become virtually completely destroyed by fire (destruction) or has been lost at
sea, for example in a fishing boat (irrecoverable). For example, in 2011 an
inquest was held under section 23 of the 1962 Act. This arose from the
disappearance of Alice Clifford over 31 years previously when, in 1979, she
went missing from a hospital aged 57.[33] At the time
of her disappearance she suffered from dementia. Despite extensive searches for
her, she has never been found and her family ultimately accepted that she had
died. The family then requested that an inquest be held under section 23 of the
1962 Act, and the Minister for Justice consented to this. At the inquest, having
heard Garda evidence and evidence from family members, the coroner directed the
jury to record an open verdict. As a result, the coroner issued a declaration
of death under the 1962 Act, which recorded that the cause of death was
undetermined. The Commission also understands that, in recent years, a coroner
was requested by the Minister for Justice to conduct an inquest under section
23 of the 1962 Act in respect of a person who had gone missing over a year
previously from a long-term care facility and whose body had not been found.
The Commission also understands that an inquest was scheduled to be held under
section 23 of the 1962 Act but that, before this occurred, the body of the
person involved was found and that the inquest proceeded under the usual procedures
in the 1962 Act. The Commission notes that section 23 of the 1962 Act is
broadly similar to section 15 of the English Coroners Act 1988, discussed
below.
1.22
The Commission understands that, in terms of the procedure followed in cases
under section 23 of the 1962 Act, a Garda report concerning any criminal
investigation is usually submitted to such an inquest. The Commission notes
that the important effect of any inquest held under the 1962 Act, including one
held under section 23, is that a coroner issues a declaration of death and that
this, in turn, allows those left behind to register the death under the Civil
Registration Act 2004 in the Register of Deaths and to obtain a death
certificate. This means that all the normal civil law consequences of
death come into effect, such as the administration and distribution of the
person’s estate and assets, the activation of any life insurance policy and
consequential effects on any marriage or civil partnership.
1.23
The Commission notes that section 23 of the 1962 Act clearly provides
for inquests in some instances that concern missing persons. While not
specifically intended to deal with missing persons in general, section 23
indicates that the Oireachtas intended to resolve the civil law status of some
missing persons.
1.24
The Commission also notes that the Coroners Bill 2007, currently
before the Oireachtas, proposes to modernise and reform the law in this
area in accordance with the 2000 Report of the Coroners Review Group.[34]
One of the significant reforms proposed in the 2000 Review Group Report, and
reflected in the 2007 Bill, would be the establishment of an Office of Chief
Coroner, who would have an important co-ordinating and general guidance role in
the development of a national Coroner Service.
1.25
In terms of an inquest being held in the circumstances to which section
23 of the 1962 Act currently applies, the Commission
notes that section 44(2) of the 2007 Bill proposes to dispense with the
requirement for approval of the Minister of Justice to hold an inquest. Section
44(2) of the 2007 Bill proposes that a coroner would be empowered to hold such
an inquest:
“if he or she
has reason to believe that the death has occurred in such circumstances that an
inquest is appropriate, even if the body has been destroyed or is
irrecoverable.”
1.26
Section 44(2) would, therefore, continue to deal, albeit indirectly,
with inquests concerning missing persons, as does section 23 of the 1962 Act.
1.27
The provisions of section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962 are clearly
very limited in scope, which is underlined by the rare circumstances in which
it has been invoked in respect of missing persons. More significantly, the
common law presumption of life up to 7 years and presumption of death after 7
years allows those left behind to
apply to the High Court to have a declaration of presumed death after 7 years,
and this may be shortened if it is reasonable to conclude that the person is
already dead. As discussed below, this declaration of presumed death is limited
to allowing the deceased’s estate to be administered. It does not have the
effect in law of a death certificate, and therefore it does not, for example,
have any effect on any marriage or civil partnership.
1.28
The common law
therefore currently provides that a person is presumed to be alive for up to 7
years after going missing, and may be presumed to have died after 7 years’
absence. As this common law presumption is rebuttable, it also recognises that
a presumption of death may be made before the 7 years has elapsed, provided
that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify this.[35]
1.29
The precise origin of
the rule that death can be presumed after 7 years is difficult to trace, but it
was first set out in statutory form in section 1 of the Bigamy Act 1603 which provided a defence to a charge of bigamy if
either:
“those that were charged, married a
second time when the first spouse had been beyond the seas for seven years, or;
Those whose spouse had been absent for seven years, although not
beyond the seas, were not known to the former to be living within that time.”
1.30
The presumption in the
1603 Act operated as a presumption of law; that is to say, the
presumption was applied automatically in the circumstances described in the
1603 Act. The 7 year rule in the 1603 Act is now reflected in section 57 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which
contains a similar defence to a charge of bigamy.
1.31
A 7 year rule was also
enacted in the English Cestui Que Vie Act 1666
and a virtually identical Act, the Life Estates Act 1695, was enacted by
the pre-1800 Irish Parliament. Section 1 of the 1695 Act (like the 1666 Act) allowed
a litigant to invoke a
presumption of death in connection with settled life estates where the
beneficiary of the settlement:
“shall remain
beyond the seas, or elsewhere absent themselves in this realm, by the space of seven
years together, and no sufficient and evident proof be made of the lives of
such person or persons respectively, in any action... the judges, before whom
such action shall be brought, shall direct the jury to give their verdict, as
if the person so remaining beyond the seas, or otherwise absenting himself,
were dead.” (emphasis added)
1.32
The Life Estates Act
1695 was one of over 150 pre-1922 Acts repealed by the Land and
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009, which derived from the Commission’s 2005 Report
on the Reform and Modernisation of Land Law and Conveyancing Law.[36]
The 2009 Act consolidated into a single statutory code the pre-1922 Acts in
this area and also introduced significant reforms. While the
2009 Act repealed the 1695 Act (and other pre-1922 Acts dealing with settled
land), Part 4 of the 2009 Act (sections 18 to 22), enacted new provisions
concerning trusts of land. Section 18(5) to (7) of the 2009 Act also
re-enacted the substance of the 1695 Act in modern form and provides:
“(5) Where, by reason
of absence from the State or otherwise, it remains uncertain for a period of at
least 7 years as to whether a person upon whose life an estate or interest
depends is alive, it shall continue to be presumed that the person is dead.
(6) If such
presumption is applied to a person but subsequently rebutted by proof to the
contrary, that person may bring an action for damages or another remedy for any
loss suffered.
(7) In dealing with
an action under subsection (6), the court may make such order as appears
to it to be just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.”
1.33
Thus, in 2009, the
Oireachtas re-enacted in section 18(5) of the 2009 Act, a 7 year rule
concerning the presumption of death; and it is notable that the Oireachtas
provided that “it shall continue to be presumed that the person is dead,” thus indicating a clear awareness
that this was not a new rule. It is also notable that section 18(6) of the 2009
Act expressly provides for the possibility that, if the person who has been
declared dead later returns, he or she “may bring an action for damages
or another remedy for any loss suffered.” In such an action, section 18(7) of
the 2009 Act specifies that the court has a wide discretion to make an order that
is “just and equitable in the circumstances.” While an order for monetary
compensation is the most likely order to be made, section 18(7) clearly
envisages the possibility that ownership could be transferred back to the
returned missing person where this was “just and equitable.”
1.34
As the Commission notes
in its comparative analysis in Part D, below, the 7 year rule is also found in
the statutory social welfare codes of other jurisdictions, such as England. The
Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005 does not contain an explicit
reference to the 7 year rule, but the Department of Social Protection has
published guidance on the widowed pension available under Part 2, Chapter 18 of
the 2005 Act.[37] This guidance states that the pension may be payable in respect of
a person whose spouse is missing. The guidance states that:
“The following matters can be taken
into account in deciding whether a person who has disappeared can be presumed
dead:
· The
length of time elapsed since s/he was last seen or heard of (if a person is
missing for a period over seven years one can apply to the courts for a
declaration stating the person is dead).
· The age and state of health of the person when s/he disappeared
· Whether s/he had any reason to disappear, (financial
embarrassment, threat of court proceedings, desertion from the Army)
· Whether
a person who would normally be in contact if s/he were alive has made contact
with spouse, if so ascertain how long it has been since spouse was last seen or
heard from.
· The efforts the claimant has made to contact his/her
spouse.”
1.35
It is clear, therefore,
that the 7 year rule has been adopted both legislatively and administratively
in Ireland.
1.36
The 7 year statutory
rule in the Life Estates Act 1695 – as recently confirmed by the
Oireachtas in the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 – was drawn
on by way of analogy in the 19th Century Irish decision McMahon
and Ors v McElroy.[38]
This was a case in which the plaintiffs claimed ownership of land, which their
brother had sold to the defendant. After he had sold the land, the brother had
left with his wife and family for the United States of America. The brother had
inherited the land but this was subject to the condition that, if he died
before his sisters, it was to be divided between them. Nine years after their
brother had left for the United States, the plaintiff sisters applied to court
to have him declared presumed dead; if they were successful, the sale to the
defendant would have been declared invalid. The plaintiffs sought to rely on
the 7 year rule alone, and had not, for example, made any efforts to trace
their brother or provide any proof that he might have died. The case was heard
in the Vice-Chancellor’s Court (the equivalent of the High Court), and the
Court refused to make the declaration of presumed death. Chatterton V-C
summarised the common law presumption as follows:[39]
“Of [the brother’s] death there
is not any positive evidence, and I am called upon to act entirely on the
ordinary presumption as to which, and as to its operation there can be no doubt
– namely, that, as a general rule, a man’s death will be presumed after an
interval of seven years since he was last heard of. But this is not an
invariable rule, and it admits of exceptions; and indeed in any case the Court
in following the analogy of the Statutes,[40]
on which analogy the rule depends, is bound to consider the circumstances of
the particular case in order to see whether the presumption is rebutted, or
rather whether it fairly arises.”
1.37
It is clear, therefore,
that the common law rule is a general but rebuttable presumption which
could be applied after 7 years absence. In the court’s view, 7 years absence in
itself was insufficient to obtain a declaration of presumed death, and that
further evidence is required to establish, on the balance of probabilities,
that death had occurred before the presumption of death would apply. The Court
also accepted, however, that where such evidence is available, the presumption
of life up to 7 years may also be rebutted and that the court “is bound to consider the
circumstances of the particular case” as they arise.
1.38
As to the case itself, Chatterton V-C concluded that, as the plaintiffs
had made no inquiries as to their brother, they were not entitled to a
declaration of presumed death. He indicated, however, that he would be prepared
to re-hear the case if evidence was later produced that demonstrated that (a)
the brother had not been heard of “by those who might reasonably expect to hear
from him”, (b) if proper enquiries were made as to his supposed place of
residence in America and (c) he had disappeared from there and could not be
traced.
1.39
The McMahon case
was cited as the main authority in this area in the 1961 decision of the High
Court in Re Doherty.[41]
In this case, Mr Doherty had purchased shares from his stockbrokers in 1919,
and had then gone to Australia. The stockbroker firm never heard from
him again, even though they had placed advertisements in Irish and Australian
newspapers looking for him or anyone who knew him to contact them. After 40
years had passed, the Minister for Finance applied to have Mr Doherty’s shares
declared bona vacantia (“ownerless goods”) and therefore, by default,
the property of the State. In the High Court, Kenny J accepted that, as the
firm of stockbrokers had purchased the shares for Mr Doherty, they could “reasonably be expected to
have heard from him about them during the last 40 years.”[42]
The Court thus applied the criteria in McMahon and Ors v McElroy to show
that the legal presumption of death could be applied after 7 years absence.[43]
In this light, and having regard to the fact that advertisements had
been placed in newspapers in Ireland and Australia, Kenny J granted an order
declaring him presumed dead. Kenny J was also prepared to make an order that Mr
Doherty had died intestate (that is, without making a will), unmarried and with
no next-of-kin.
1.40
It is clear that the
mere absence of a person for 7 years is not sufficient to establish that a
person is to be presumed dead. Conversely, if the facts of a particular
case demonstrate, a person may be declared dead by the High Court before
7 years have passed. Thus, in In the Goods of Freytag[44]
the circumstances were that Mr Freytag had been staying in a hotel in Messina,
Sicily and had arranged a business meeting for the next morning, 28 December
1908. That was the date on which a catastrophic earthquake destroyed most of
Messina (this remains one of the most devastating earthquakes in modern
European history). Mr Freytag did not turn up for his meeting (or any
subsequent meeting ever again). His Italian colleagues wrote to the family,
outlining the circumstances and indicating that attempts were made to locate
him, but his body was never located. Mr Freytag’s brother travelled to Messina
and made extensive searches for him, including advertising for his whereabouts,
but again this proved fruitless. The family applied to the High Court for an
order of presumed death and in the proceedings the letter from the Italian
colleagues was produced, but for some reason the advertisements were not.
Notwithstanding this, Boyd J granted an order that Mr Freytag should be
presumed dead and that his brother should be given liberty to apply for a grant
of probate. In this case, the time from Mr Freytag’s disappearance to the date
of the order was only 3 months. Similarly, in In the Goods of
Inkerman Brown[45]
the High Court declared Mr Inkerman Brown presumed dead just 2 months after the
ship he was on had sunk.
1.41
A similar recent example is of the Irish citizen Brendan Donegan who
disappeared while attempting to climb the Peruvian Andes in South America. His
wife successfully applied to the High Court for an order for administration of
his estate on the basis that, although his body had not been found, the
evidence in this case was sufficient to establish that his death was, in the
language of the terminology used in this Consultation Paper, virtually certain.[46]
1.42
In summary, at common
law, where the person is missing for 7 years, and they have not made contact
with those likely to have heard from them, and reasonable efforts have been
made to locate them, they may be presumed dead. If it can be proved on the
balance of probabilities, however, that, as in In the Goods of
Freytag,[47]
the missing person has in fact died before 7 years has passed, then a
declaration of presumed death may be issued by the High Court. The declaration of presumed death
does not have the same automatic effects as the issuing of a standard death
certificate. It is, rather, a declaration of limited power and generally is
made to allow a grant of administration of the person’s estate. This
declaration does not, for example, affect or alter the status of a marriage or
civil partnership.[48]
1.43
Commenting on the case
law in Ireland, Power sets out the following detailed list of matters which
should be included in any application for a declaration of presumed death:[49]
1. The applicant
should provide the court with a watershed, a date that was the last time the
supposed deceased was heard from.
2. The applicant
should provide evidence tending to indicate that the individual is dead, such
as:
(a) the circumstances surrounding the disappearance,
(b) lack of communication with people who were likely to hear
from him or her, detailing the last known correspondence or communication, and
(c) the length of time since disappearance.
3. In most cases,
unless there are exceptional circumstances, the applicant should advertise for
information concerning the whereabouts of the supposed deceased.
4. If possible, the
applicant should arrange for the search-and-rescue authorities to confirm, by
way of affidavit if possible, that attempts were made to locate the individual,
but were fruitless.
5. The applicant
should set out the full background relating to the disappearance, including the
background as to the supposed deceased’s age and health. This should include
mental health, where relevant, such as suicidal tendencies.
6. The applicant
should also arrange for the details to be corroborated as much as possible by a
family member.
7. The applicant’s
affidavit should set out the next-of-kin entitled to distribution of his assets
on his death.
8. The applicant must
aver their belief that the individual is dead.
1.44
The Commission notes
that this comprehensive list of matters reflects those referred to in the
decisions of courts in other countries and jurisdictions that apply a similar
“presumed dead” rule, including in Australia and Canada. The Commission now
turns to examine the position in other countries, against the background of the
development of international standards in this area, notably in the 2009
Council of Europe Recommendation on Missing Persons.
1.45
In this Part, the
Commission examines international and comparative developments
concerning missing persons. In approaching the categorisation of missing
persons for the purpose of this Consultation Paper, the Commission has had the
benefit of the research that lay behind the 2009 Council of Europe Recommendation
on Principles Concerning Missing Persons and the Presumption of Death.[50] In the context of the presumption of death, the Commission
notes the importance of the 2009 Council of Europe Recommendation on Missing
Persons, because this provides a general framework around which the law on the
presumption of death may be reformed. In terms of comparative analysis, the
Commission also notes that many countries have, in addition to enacting
legislation on the presumption of death, put in place specific provisions to
deal with interim financial issues for those left behind, such as limited
administration of the missing person’s assets and estate. These provisions
operate quite separately from the question of presumption of death.
1.46
In the aftermath of
World War II (1939-1945), the United Nations recognised the need for the
international community to provide for situations where a declaration of death
is required for missing persons.[51]
The resulting 1950 UN Convention on the Declaration of Death
of Missing Persons[52] facilitated issuing a declaration
of death of missing persons who disappeared during the years 1939-1945:
“under circumstances affording reasonable ground to infer that
they have died in consequence of events of war or of racial, religious,
political or national persecution”.[53]
1.47
The 1950 UN Convention
is limited to deaths arising from war and does not, therefore, apply to persons
whose disappearance is connected with non-military or related events referred
to in the Convention, such as those who go missing in earthquakes, civil air
disasters or merchant shipping disasters.[54]
Such circumstances, where death is virtually certain, were dealt with in the
1966 Convention on Establishing Death (sometimes referred to as the
Athens Convention), which was developed by the International Commission on
Civil Status (ICCS) (the
Athens Convention).[55] Ireland
is not a member state of the ICCS and is not a party to the 1966 Convention,
but the 1966 Convention formed the background to the 2009 Council of Europe
Recommendation on Missing Persons, which deals not only with circumstances in
which death is virtually certain but also the much wider situation where the
circumstances of the person being missing raises concerns for their safety and
well-being to the point where death is highly probable.
1.48
In 2009, the Council of Europe adopted a Recommendation on Principles
Concerning Missing Persons and the Presumption of Death.[56] In preparing
this 2009 Recommendation, the Council of Europe’s Working Party on Missing
Persons noted the limited nature of existing international law instruments
concerning missing persons, including that the 1966 ICCS Convention on Missing
Persons deals only with situations where death is virtually certain.[57]
1.49
The Council of Europe’s Working
Party on Missing Persons thus noted that the 1966 Convention would apply
in situations such as the 1977 collision between two planes on the ground in
Tenerife (Canary Islands) or the 2001 attack on the New York “Twin Towers”.[58]
The Working Party also
considered that the 1966 Athens Convention could also apply, for
example, where a person is a passenger on board a ship out at sea who was seen
shortly before his or her disappearance and who proves to have been suffering
from psychological problems:[59]
“The ship is of course thoroughly searched, in vain, but only
his or her bathrobe is found on a chair on deck. When it further emerges that
the stretch of sea in question is shark-infested at the relevant time of year,
and that the coastguard has (therefore) failed to find a corpse, it can
obviously be assumed that the person went overboard (whether he or she jumped
or was pushed) and that his or her death can be regarded as certain.”
1.50
The Working Party also noted that the 1966 Convention does not deal with
situations where death is less than certain but is highly probable, such as
where a person is believed to be dead but whose body cannot be recovered
because of the inaccessibility or other natural condition of a given area.[60]
In other situations where missing persons are believed to have died, which do
not involve shipwreck, any other type of accident, a disaster or warfare, the
Working Party noted that:
“it is pointless and excessive to
require the survivors to wait for a specified period before launching a
procedure to secure a finding of death.”
1.51
The Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation thus concluded that it was
appropriate to put in place general principles that deal not only with
situations where death is virtually certain but also where death is highly
probable. The 2009 Recommendation therefore set out a number of principles that
should inform any legislation enacted in this area by the Member States. The
Commission has had regard to these principles in preparing this Consultation
Paper.
1.52
The 2009 Recommendation refers to three categories of missing person in
the context of presumed death. These are where:
“(a) death can be taken as certain; or
(b) it is reasonable to conclude that the death of the missing
person is likely; or
(c) although the missing person’s death is uncertain, his
or her disappearance cannot be reasonably attributed to any cause other than
death.”[61] (emphasis added)
1.53
For the reasons given below, the Commission considers that, while these
three categories are of considerable assistance in delineating different cases
of missing people, it may be more useful to consider two general categories,
where death is virtually certain and other circumstances where it is highly
probable that the person will not return.
1.54
In addition to the categorisation of missing persons for the purposes of
enacting laws on presumed death, the 2009 Recommendation sets out a number of
detailed Principles for member states. For completeness, these are set out in
full here.
Principle 1 (cases
where a declaration of presumed death in respect of a missing person may be
issued).
A declaration of
presumed death of the missing person may be issued if, in the light of all the
circumstances of his or her disappearance: (a) death can be taken as certain;
or (b) it is reasonable to conclude that the death of the missing person is
likely; or (c) although the missing person’s death is uncertain, his or her
disappearance cannot be reasonably attributed to any cause other than death.
Principle
2 (competent authority).
An authority
competent to issue a declaration of presumed death with regard to a missing
person (“competent authority”) may be designated: (a) where the missing person
was a national of the state to which the competent authority belongs, or was
domiciled or had his or her habitual residence in its territory; (b) where the
person concerned was reported missing in the territory of that state; (c) where
the person concerned was reported missing during a voyage of a vessel or
aircraft registered in that state.
Principle
3 (requesting person, body or authority).
A request for a declaration
of presumed death may be lodged by any person or body demonstrating a
legitimate interest or by an authority designated by the state for this
purpose.
Principle
4 (waiting period for lodging the request).
4(1). Where, in the light
of all the circumstances, the death of the missing person can be taken as
certain, the lodging of the request mentioned under Principle 3 should
preferably be possible without a waiting period.
4(2). Where the
circumstances of disappearance of the missing person are such that it is
reasonable to conclude that his or her death is likely, the time which must
have elapsed from the disappearance, or from the
receipt of the last news that the person was alive, for lodging the request
should preferably be one year at the most.
4(3). Where the death of
the missing person is uncertain, the time which must have elapsed from the disappearance, or from the receipt of the last news that the
person was alive, for lodging the request should preferably be seven years at
the most.
Principle
5 (date and hour of presumed death).
The date and, if
possible, the hour of presumed death of the missing person should be determined
by referring to any evidence or indication relating to the circumstances of the
case.
Principle
6 (effects).
6(1). By operation of law,
the declaration of presumed death should have all the legal effects of death.
6(2). Nevertheless, member
states may make such exceptions to this provision as they consider strictly
necessary. These exceptions should be limited but may cover matters such as
marriage, registered partnerships, legal affiliation, property rights and
inheritance rights and should aim at maintaining a fair balance between the
interests of those concerned, including the person whose presumed death is declared.
Principle
7 (return of the person whose presumed death has been declared).
7(1). Should the person,
in respect of whom the declaration of presumed death has been issued, return,
or where there is information establishing that he or she is still alive,
member states should prescribe measures aiming at annulling the decision
declaring this person’s death.
7(2). A request for
annulment of a declaration of presumed death may be lodged by the person whose
presumed death has been declared or by any person or body demonstrating a
legitimate interest, as well as by an authority designated by the state for
this purpose.
7(3). Member states may
make provision for the protection of persons who may be adversely affected by
the annulment of the decision.
Principle 8
(transcription of decisions)
A decision declaring
the presumed death of the missing person or a decision on annulment, referred
to in Principles 2 and 7 respectively, should be transcribed in the relevant
registers of the state where such a decision was pronounced.
Principle 9
(procedural aspects)
1. Access to
proceedings and their duration should balance the concerns and needs of all
those having a legitimate interest in the declaration of presumed death, as
well as of the missing person. This should also apply to proceedings concerning
annulment.
2. When publicity
concerning the search for a missing person is deemed necessary during the
course of proceedings regarding a declaration of presumed death, this should be
carried out by any appropriate means, including new technologies, and taking
into account the financial situation of the requesting person.
1.55
As already mentioned, the Commission considers that the principles set
out in the 2009 Council of Europe Recommendation provide an extremely helpful
template against which to consider reform of the law in this area.
1.56
The preparation of the
2009 Council of Europe Recommendation was influenced by the existence of
long-established legislation on missing persons in many Council of Europe
member states, notably those with a Civil Law tradition. In the early 19th
Century, many Civil Law states, such as France and Germany, introduced specific
statutory provisions dealing with the civil law status of missing persons.
Thus, the Napoleonic Code Civil Francaise of 1804 contained detailed
provisions on the issue, which was directly related to the need to deal with
the consequences of French soldiers going missing for many years in wartime
(which the UN, as mentioned above, dealt with in the aftermath of World War
II). As discussed below, other Civil Law states outside Europe, such as Canada,
have been influenced by this historical inheritance.
1.57
In Scotland, whose
legal system reflects its mixed Civil Law and Common Law history, the
Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977 permits a declaration of presumed
death for missing persons who have disappeared in circumstances where either it
is reasonable to believe they have died, or due to the 7 year absence of the
person the death of the person may be presumed. The Scottish 1977 Act has been
mirrored substantially in Northern Ireland in the Presumption of Death Act
(Northern Ireland) 2009. The enactment of the Northern Ireland 2009 Act was
influenced, in part, by the need to address the civil law status of the
“Disappeared”, those who went missing in Northern Ireland in the violent
conflict that took place between the early 1970s and the late 1990s. As noted
in the Introduction to this Consultation Paper, the Commission points out that
the legacy of that conflict has also affected this State, since a number of
people either went missing in the State or are presumed to have been killed in
Northern Ireland or this State and were later buried in this State.
1.58
There has also been
growing recognition in a number of Common Law states that the law on missing
persons must cater, as has been the case in many Civil Law states since the 19th
Century, for situations where the missing person is not to be presumed dead.
For example, in the Australian state of Victoria[62]
and the Canadian province of Ontario,[63] adult
guardianship and mental capacity legislation has incorporated specific
provision for limited administration and management of the property of missing
persons so that day-to-day practical matters, such as the ongoing payment of
bills, can be dealt with by those left behind. In the remainder of this Part,
the Commission discusses these comparative legislative developments.
1.59
In Northern Ireland, as in this State, there is implicit provision for
holding an inquest in connection with a missing person. Section 14 of the Coroners
(Northern Ireland) Act 1959 provides:
“Where the Attorney General has reason
to believe that a deceased person has died in circumstances which in his
opinion make the holding of an inquest advisable he may direct any coroner
(whether or not he is the coroner for the district in which the death has
occurred) to conduct an inquest into the death of that person, and that coroner
shall proceed to conduct an inquest in accordance with the provisions of this
Act (and as if, not being the coroner for the district in which the death
occurred, he were such coroner) whether or not he or any other coroner has viewed
the body, made any inquiry or investigation, held any inquest into or done any
other act in connection with the death.”
1.60
It is notable that section 14 of the 1959 Act is more broadly drafted
than the equivalent section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962 and thus, at
least implicitly, could be applied to all cases of missing persons, not merely
those whose bodies have, as the 1962 Act provides, been “destroyed” or are
“irrecoverable.” Nonetheless, it appears that section 14 of the 1959 Act has
not been used in connection with cases where the “Disappeared” have remained
missing, and the only inquests into such persons have been “standard” inquests
where the bodies have been recovered.[64] Indeed, the
absence of a suitable process for obtaining a declaration of presumed death for
the “Disappeared” was one of the key reasons given in the 2008 Consultation
Document for the enactment of what became the Presumption of Death (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009.[65]
1.61
The Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009 largely
reflects the content of the Scottish Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act
1977. Both Acts deal with situations where those left behind wish to bring
a claim for a declaration of presumed death of the missing person. They do not
deal with arrangements for dealing with the property of missing person falling
short of a presumption of death.
1.62
The enactment of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009
was preceded by a 2008 Consultation Paper[66]
and 2008 Report[67] published by
the Department of Finance and Personnel. The Consultation Paper and Report
recommended reform of the law to allow for a procedure to obtain a declaration
of presumed death for missing persons who are presumed dead.[68]
1.63
In terms of the type of persons that should be included in the reformed
presumption of death law, the Report noted that:
“the wider group of missing persons
will likely include the young and the elderly, men and women, people who are
married with children as well as those who are single and childless. There will
always remain, however, a number of missing persons who do not return for some
reason. The majority may wish simply to break contact with family and friends.
However, some of those who are reported missing will have died either at the
time of their disappearance or sometime thereafter either as a result of
self-harm, accident or foul play.”[69]
1.64
The 2009 Act that resulted from the 2008 Report therefore deals with the
small, but appreciable, number of missing persons who are not found. In
categorising these missing persons, section 1 of the Presumption of Death
(Northern Ireland) Act 2009 provides for the making of a presumption of
death order:
“[w]here a person who is missing—
(a) is thought to have died; or
(b) has not been known to be alive for
a period of at least 7 years.”
1.65
Section 1(a) of the 2009 Act provides for situations where the missing
person is believed to have disappeared in circumstances that indicate that he or
she may have died. Section 1(b) of the 2009 Act provides for situations where
the 7 year absence, coupled with a lack of information regarding the person,
raises the presumption that the person may no longer be alive. In both
circumstances, a presumption of death order may be issued. This order permits
the standard consequences of death to arise, such as the grant of
administration of the estate or affecting the status of a marriage or civil
partnership.
1.66
Similarly in Scotland, section 1(1) of the Presumption of Death
(Scotland) Act 1977 provides for a declaration of presumed death for a
missing person: “[w]here a person who is missing is thought to
have died or has not been known to be alive for a period of at least seven
years.” Therefore, as in Northern Ireland, the Presumption of
Death (Scotland) Act 1977 provides for the categories of where it is
believed that the missing person has died.
1.67
As in Ireland, there is
currently no general legislation dealing with missing persons in England and
Wales, although as discussed below the introduction of presumption of death
legislation along the lines enacted in Scotland and Northern Ireland is
currently under consideration. At present, therefore, the law in England is
broadly comparable to the position in Ireland, including comparable provisions
in the English Coroners Act 1988 and the common law presumption of death
after 7 years.
1.68
In terms of the
categorisation of missing persons who may be presumed dead, section 15 of the
English Coroners Act 1988 allows for the issuing of
a death certificate in situations where the body of the missing person is
either destroyed by fire or cannot be recovered. Section 15 provides:
“(1) Where a coroner has reason to believe—
(a) that a death has occurred in or near
his district in such circumstances that an inquest ought to be held; and
(b) that owing to the destruction of the
body by fire or otherwise, or to the fact that the body is lying in a place
from which it cannot be recovered, an inquest cannot be held except in
pursuance of this section,
he may
report the facts to the Secretary of State.
(2) Where a report is made under subsection (1) above, the
Secretary of State may, if he considers it desirable to do so, direct a coroner
(whether the coroner making the report or another) to hold an inquest into the
death.”
1.69
This corresponds closely to section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962,
discussed above (and it may be noted that, in this respect, both are more narrow in scope than section 14 of the Coroners
(Northern Ireland) Act 1959). As in Ireland, this has been used in the
context of missing persons. For example, when Englishman John Darwin
disappeared while canoeing in March 2002, and appeared at the time to have
drowned, and after his wife had reported him missing, in April 2003 an inquest
into his disappearance under section 15 of the 1988 Act. Having heard evidence
of the police investigations into the matter, which at that stage were
consistent with his death, the coroner recorded an open verdict, and a death
certificate was issued. Arising from this, Mrs Darwin successfully made claims
totalling £250,000 on a life insurance policy and a mortgage protection policy
on their family home. In fact, as already discussed, Mr Darwin had faked his
suicide with his wife’s knowledge. In 2007, he entered a police station in
London claiming he had suffered from amnesia for the previous 5 years. He and
his wife were later convicted of conspiracy to defraud.[70]
1.70
Clearly, the Darwin case was an instance of a fraudulent attempt to take
advantage of section 15 of the 1988 Act and the consequent financial benefits
of obtaining a death certificate by deceit. Equally clearly, in circumstances
where fraud is not involved, section 15 of the 1988 Act provides an efficient
method for obtaining a death certificate for those left behind. It has been
reported that, in England, section 15 of the 1988 Act is employed less than 10
times annually to deal with missing persons.[71]
1.71
As in Ireland, in
situations where the Coroners Act 1988 is not applicable, the common law
presumption of death allows for a declaration of presumed death to be issued
where the person has been missing for 7 years. As already noted, the common law
presumption may be rebutted so that a declaration of presumed death may be made
where it can be shown that the missing person has in fact died before the end
of 7 years. As also already noted, the declaration of presumed death does not
result in the issuing of a death certificate, but usually is limited to an
order allowing the administration of the missing person’s estate to occur.
1.72
The general approach
taken by the courts in Ireland to the common law presumption (discussed above)
is also applied by the English courts. Thus, in the English High Court decision
Re Watkins,[72] Harman J
stated:
“there is no “magic” in the mere fact
of a period of seven years elapsing without there being positive evidence of a
person being alive. It is, generally speaking, a matter in each case of taking
the facts as a whole and of balancing, as a jury would, the respective
probabilities of life continuing and having ceased.”
1.73
This was cited with
approval by Sachs J in another English High Court decision, Chard v Chard.[73] Echoing
the approach of the Irish High Court in McMahon and Ors v McElroy,[74] discussed above, Sachs J held that the presumption will apply
if:
(a) there is no acceptable affirmative evidence of a person
alive at some time during the 7 year period, and
(b) persons likely to have heard from the absentee had not done
so during that period, and
(c) due enquiries were made as to the whereabouts of the missing
person.
1.74
It appears therefore
that, under English common law, a declaration of presumed death does not affect
or alter the validity of the missing person’s marriage. As already noted, if a
missing person’s spouse remarries after 7 years, the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provides a full defence to a
bigamy charge even if the missing person returns. This does not, however,
affect the civil law status of the marriage. It is likely that this also
reflects the position in this State. Legislation has been enacted in England to
deal specifically with this matter. Section 19 of the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973 and
section 37 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 provide, respectively, for the dissolution of a
marriage or civil partnership where there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the missing person is probably dead, including after 7 years absence. No
equivalent provisions have been enacted in Ireland.
1.75
Similarly section 8 of
the English Social Security Act 1998 empowers the Secretary of State for Social Security to
take into account that a spouse of a claimant may be presumed dead in relation
to a range of benefits. A specific provision is also made by section 3 of the Social
Security Administration Act 1992 which deals with late claims for bereavement benefit
where it is difficult to establish death.[75]
1.76
It is therefore clear
that English law, through a combination of the common law presumption and the
legislative provisions mentioned, has some limited recognition for categories
of missing persons where they disappear in circumstances that indicate their
death may have occurred.
1.77
In 2011, a UK
Houses of Parliament All-Party Parliamentary Group on Runaway and Missing
Children and Adults began a consultative process that may lead to a more
complete reform of the law on missing persons.[76]
This has resulted in the Justice
Select Committee’s Inquiry into presumption of death legislation in England and
Wales. At the time of writing (November 2011) this has not yet led to final
recommendations, but it is anticipated that the Committee will recommend the
introduction of a legislative framework along the lines of the 1977 Scottish
and 2009 Northern Ireland Acts already discussed, which would permit those left
behind to obtain a presumption of death certificate where it can be established
that the missing person has died.
1.78
In Australia, the law
provides for missing persons who disappear in circumstances that may indicate
that they have died. As is the case in Ireland and the United Kingdom, this is
provided for using the common law presumption of death after 7 years. This
common law presumption allows those left behind to obtain a grant of
administration concerning the missing person’s estate where the person is
presumed dead.
1.79
Legislation in New
South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory also makes provision
for the category of persons who go missing in circumstances where no
presumption of death is possible. Under these laws, those left behind may
obtain an interim administration order, which permits an administrator to
manage the day to day affairs of the missing person, but has no effect on the
status of the missing person.
1.80
In Australia, there is no generally applicable legislation for missing
persons who are believed to have died but the common law presumption of death
also operates. In the leading decision of the High Court of Australia in Axon
v Axon,[77]
Dixon J stated:[78]
“If, at the time when the issue of whether a man is alive or
dead must be judicially determined, at least seven years have elapsed since he
was last seen or heard of by those who in the circumstances of the case would
according to the common course of affairs be likely to have received
communication from him or to have learned of his whereabouts, were he is
living, then, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be found
that he is dead.”
1.81
As in Ireland, therefore, the position in Australia is that the
presumption of life up to 7 years is rebuttable and a presumption of death may
be made where death is established the balance of probabilities before the
expiration of 7 years absence. Thus, in Re Bennett,[79]
where evidence was shown that a diver disappeared after becoming disorientated
during a dive off the coast of South Korea, a declaration of presumed death was
made 2 years after the incident.
1.82
In circumstances where no such evidence exists, an application can be
made after 7 years absence in order to have a person declared presumed
dead. This was the case in Re Hills,[80]
where the Supreme Court of South Australia declared presumed dead a man who had
schizophrenia and who had been missing for 13 years. The medical evidence was
that, when not on his medication, it was likely that he would have committed
suicide during the 13 years.[81]
1.83
In New South Wales,[82]
Victoria[83] and the
Australian Capital Territory,[84] adult
guardianship laws (which broadly correspond to the proposed mental capacity
legislation due to be enacted in Ireland)[85]
have been extended to include specific provision to allow those left behind to
administer some assets of missing persons. In these states and territories, the
legislation allows for the appointment of an administrator to manage the
affairs of a person, where this person is missing and is not believed to have
died. These arrangements have no effect on the civil status of the missing
person, such as their married status, and do not amount to a declaration of
presumed death.
1.84
The intention of these
legislative provisions is to permit a limited use of property where there is a
demonstrated need for decisions to be made and it is in the best interests for
an administrator to be appointed to make these decisions regarding the affairs
of the person while the person remains missing. The appointment of an administrator
is most likely to arise in situations where the person is missing without proof
of death, but it could also be used even where death is virtually certain or
probable, particularly if those left behind do not wish to obtain a declaration
of death or presumed death.
1.85
In this regard, the
legislation treats certain missing persons in the same way as persons whose
capacity may be limited in the sense that it provides for a process to manage
their property. In enacting in effect an additional graft onto the existing
adult guardianship legislation, Australian law allows for the appointment of
administrators to the estate of missing persons, if:
“(a) it is not known whether the person is alive; and
(b) reasonable efforts have been made
to find the person; and
(c) for at least 90 days, the person
has not contacted–
(i) anyone who lives at the person's
last-known home address; or
(ii) any relative or friend of the person with whom the person is
likely to communicate.”[86]
1.86
The administrator is appointed initially for a 2 year period, but this
may be extended for a further 2 years.[87] Any person
may apply for an order to be appointed as an administrator, but in general the
Court will appoint someone who is close to the missing person, for example, a
relative or close friend. For example, in a Victorian case Rosewall
(Guardianship),[88] the father
of the missing person was deemed an appropriate administrator in the
circumstances. The Court will make this decision having regard to the wishes of
the missing person, in so far as they can be ascertained.
1.87
The advantage of a law
dealing exclusively with cases of missing persons, who are not believed to have
died, is that those left behind are not required to wait for up to 7 years
before obtaining an administration order to deal with the affairs of a missing
person.
1.88
In six of Canada’s
provinces,[89] legislation
provides that a person who is missing may be presumed dead if:
“[u]pon application... the court is satisfied that–
(a) a person has been absent and not
heard of or from by the applicant, or to the knowledge of the applicant by any
other person, since a day named;
(b) the applicant has no reason to
believe that the person is living; and
(c) reasonable grounds exist for
supposing that the person is dead.”[90]
1.89
The legislation in these provinces does not expressly delineate between
the categories where a missing person may be presumed dead. As the following
examination of its application shows, however, the courts are conscious of the
separate categories of where death is virtually certain and where death is
either likely or the person is long-term missing, so that no other explanation
other than the death of the person is plausible.
1.90
In Kotai v Queen of North (The)[91] the Court granted a declaration of presumed death in
circumstances where a couple were last seen on board a sinking ship which had
run aground. In Re Burgess,[92]
the subject of the application was a member of the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle
Club. The Court heard evidence from the police and the wife of the presumed
deceased that indicated foul play was a factor in the disappearance.[93]
The Court, in granting the declaration, stated:
“The evidence satisfies me that no person has seen Rick Burgess
since January 7, 2002... While the evidence of events after Mr. Burgess’
disappearance are by their nature hearsay, they are in the circumstances the
best evidence available and can only lead to the conclusion that the ‘dark
side’ of Mr. Burgess’ life caught up with him and the only reasonable inference
is that his life has been ended by ‘person unknown.’”[94]
1.91
In Re Cyr,[95] the Supreme Court of British Columbia noted, with some
reluctance, that previous case law[96] had taken
the view that any “reasonable grounds” which existed for supposing that the
person was dead was to be judged on the balance of probabilities. The Court
stated:
“While there is a reasonable basis for believing that Cyr [the
subject of the application] is dead, there is also some basis for concluding
that he has chosen to disappear. I am unable to find on a balance of probabilities
that he is dead.”
1.92
In effect, this means that where the person has been missing for less
than 7 years, the legislation will only apply where death is either virtually
certain or, at the very least, probable. In Re Cyr, the Court also added
that the applicant could still wait until 7 years had passed from the time of
her husband’s disappearance and then bring a claim under the common law
presumption of death.[97]
1.93
Section 2 of the
Ontario Declarations of Death Act 2002 explicitly
provides for two categories where death can be presumed. The first category, in
section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, applies to persons who disappear “in
circumstances of peril”:
(a) the individual has disappeared in
circumstances of peril;
(b) the applicant has not heard of or
from the individual since the disappearance;
(c) to the applicant’s knowledge, after
making reasonable inquiries, no other person has heard of or from the
individual since the disappearance;
(d) the applicant has no reason to
believe that the individual is alive; and
(e) there is sufficient evidence to
find that the individual is dead.”
1.94
This provides for situations where it is believed to be virtually
certain that the missing person has died.
1.95
The second category, in
section 2(5) of the 2002 Act, places the common law 7 year presumption on a
statutory footing:
“(5) This subsection applies if,
(a) the
individual has been absent for at least seven years;
(b) the
applicant has not heard of or from the individual during the seven-year period;
(c) to
the applicant’s knowledge, after making reasonable inquiries, no other person
has heard of or from the individual during the seven-year period;
(d) the
applicant has no reason to believe that the individual is alive; and
(e) there
is sufficient evidence to find that the individual is dead.” [98]
1.96
In Sherman v National Life Assurance Co. of Canada[99]
the insurance company applied for a declaration to nullify an earlier court
declaration of presumed death. The company presented evidence that the subject
of the declaration, Mr Sherman, had actually gone into hiding due to
investigations being carried out by the Metropolitan Toronto Fraud Squad,
amongst others, into his involvement in questionable stock transactions and
fraudulent banking transactions.[100]
The insurance company also presented evidence that he had been seen in public
during the alleged 7 year period of absence.[101]
The Court also heard evidence that the police had believed that, at the time of
the disappearance, one person had wanted to kill the “presumed deceased.” It
was also claimed that the presumed deceased had close associations with
well-known criminals and violent persons.[102]
In affirming the original ruling, Steel J stated:
“[having] carefully considered the
evidence in the context of whether Sherman was dead or in hiding... the judge
was obviously satisfied that the presumption had not been rebutted. He relied
on the presumption because he was satisfied that, after a careful and diligent
search, Sherman had not been seen or heard of in seven years and his acceptance
of the claimant's firm conviction that Sherman was dead. After reviewing the
evidence I cannot say that his conclusion was erroneous.”[103]
1.97
It is clear, therefore,
that Ontario differentiates more clearly through sections 2(4) and 2(5) of the
2002 Act between situations where death is virtually certain and where
death is probable due to the circumstances in which the person disappeared, or
as a result of a long-term absence.
1.98
The legislative
provisions in both Quebec and Alberta do not explicitly differentiate between
the various categories of missing persons who disappear in circumstances that
indicate that they may have died. For example, Article 92 of the Quebec Civil
Code states that:
“A declaratory judgment of
death may be pronounced on the application of any interested person, including
the Public Curator or the Minister of Revenue as provisional administrator of
property, seven years after disappearance.
It may also be pronounced before that time where the death of a
person domiciled in Québec or presumed to have died there may be held to be
certain although it is impossible to draw up an attestation of death.”
1.99
Article 92 allows for a general presumption of death to arise after
seven years, should the person go missing without trace. This is qualified in
the second part of Article 92, so that proof may be given that a person may be
deemed presumed dead before the expiration of the seven year period, where
death is virtually certain and where
death is probable due to the circumstances in which the person disappeared, or
as a result of a long-term absence.
1.100
Similarly, in Alberta, under section 94 of the Surrogate Rules:
“The
court may permit a person to swear to the death of another person if there is
no direct evidence of the death but there is evidence from which the death can
be presumed.”[104]
1.101
In Comey v Manufacturing Life Insurance Co.[105] the Alberta High Court stated
that there were “no preconditions” in bringing such an application, provided
that there is sufficient evidence on the balance of probabilities that death
occurred. In assessing this balance, the court stated it would take into
account the following non-exhaustive factors:
“a. the time, location, and
circumstances of the disappearance
b. the extent and nature of
post-disappearance searches
c. a prior history of fraud
d. the presence or absence of a motive
for the missing person to remain alive but disappear
e. the time between a life insurance
policy being obtained and the subsequent disappearance
f. facts suggesting the disappearance
was a consequence of foul play
g. abandonment of valuable property.”[106]
1.102
In Re Vos Estate,[107] the
subject of the application disappeared after going for a walk. It was shown
that he had suffered from Alzheimer’s disease at the time of his disappearance
and had no known motive for disappearing. The Court was satisfied, taking
everything into account on the balance of probabilities, that
the subject of the application had disappeared in circumstances that indicated
that he had most probably died. The Court therefore issued a presumption of
death order.
1.103
The law in Alberta, as in Quebec, provides for categories of where the
missing person may be presumed dead. Although Article 94 of the Quebec Civil
Code and the legislative provisions in Alberta do not explicitly differentiate
between the various categories of missing person who may disappear in
circumstances that indicate that he or she may have died, the case law
discussed illustrates that the Courts are aware of the need to distinguish
between the different categories.
1.104
In a number of Canadian
provinces, the law provides for the category of missing persons for whom it is
not believed have died. For example, in Ontario[108]
and Quebec,[109] provision
is made for a scheme similar to those in New South Wales, Australian Capital
Territories and Victoria, discussed above. These allow for a tutor (in Quebec)
or a committee (in Ontario) to be appointed to manage the affairs of a missing
person or “absentee.” The object of the legislation is to make sure that
the estate of an absentee is administered and not left to waste.[110]
1.105
Section 1 of the Absentees
Act 1990 defines an absentee as:
“a person who, having had his or her
usual place of residence or domicile in Ontario, has disappeared, whose
whereabouts is unknown and as to whom there is no knowledge as to whether he or
she is alive or dead.”[111]
1.106
The intention of the
1990 Act is, broadly, similar to those in the Australian states and provinces
already discussed. The 1990 Act permits a limited use of property where there
is a demonstrated need for decisions to be made and it is in the best interests
of the missing person for an administrator to be appointed to make these decisions
regarding the affairs of the missing person while the person remains missing.
1.107
The Commission’s
examination in this Chapter of the approach to the categorisation of missing
persons illustrates that, for the purposes of making determinations of presumed
death, there are two principal categories of missing person: those where death
is virtually certain, and those where it is highly probable that the
person will not return due to the circumstances in which the person
disappeared.
1.108
The first category,
where death is virtually certain, would include the following:
1.109
The second category,
where it is highly probable that the person is dead, would include the
following:
1.110
The Commission
considers that, in connection with both categories, any person applying for a
declaration of presumed death must establish on the balance of probabilities
that death should be presumed. This will involve presenting the type of
information that would currently be prepared under the common law rules and
case law already discussed. As the Commission has already noted, in Ireland the
following detailed list of matters should be included in any application for a
declaration of presumed death:[113]
1. The applicant
should provide the court with a watershed, a date that was the last time the
supposed deceased was heard from.
2. The applicant
should provide evidence tending to indicate that the individual is dead, such
as:
(a) the circumstances surrounding the disappearance,
(b) lack of communication with people who were likely to hear
from him or her, detailing the last known correspondence or communication, and
(c) the length of time since disappearance.
3. In most cases,
unless there are exceptional circumstances, the applicant should advertise for
information concerning the whereabouts of the supposed deceased.
4. If possible, the
applicant should arrange for the search-and-rescue authorities to confirm, by
way of affidavit if possible, that attempts were made to locate the individual,
but were fruitless.
5. The applicant
should set out the full background relating to the disappearance, including the
background as to the supposed deceased’s age and health. This should include
mental health, where relevant, such as suicidal tendencies.
6. The applicant
should also arrange for the details to be corroborated as much as possible by a
family member.
7. The applicant’s
affidavit should set out the next-of-kin entitled to distribution of his assets
on his death.
8. The applicant must
aver their belief that the individual is dead.
1.111
This approach is
consistent with the specific factors set out in the Canadian case Comey
v Manufacturing Life Insurance Co,[114]
namely:
(a) the time, location, and
circumstances of the disappearance
(b) the extent and nature of
post-disappearance searches
(c) a prior history of fraud
(d) the presence or absence of a motive
for the missing person to remain alive but disappear
(e) the time between a life insurance
policy being obtained and the subsequent disappearance
(f) facts suggesting the disappearance
was a consequence of foul play
(g) abandonment of valuable property.[115]
1.112
The Commission
considers that this two category approach to missing persons would involve a
greater degree of clarity by comparison with existing law in Ireland. The
Commission accepts that, to some degree, section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962
currently provides for some aspects of those who are missing and where
death is virtually certain, but it is limited to some categories only and does
not expressly deal with missing persons in general terms. The Commission also
acknowledges that the common law rule concerning 7 years absence provides a
clear and reliable indicator of where death is either certain or is highly
probable and where significant remedies can be put in place to provide for
those left behind.
1.113
The Commission
considers, however, that there is a strong argument for putting in place a
clear statutory framework that would set out the circumstances in which such
remedies may be obtained. The Commission is conscious in this respect that the
State is required to implement the key elements of the 2009 Council of Europe
Recommendation on Missing Persons, and that a statutory framework would meet
this obligation. The Commission also notes that, in the context of the recent
history of Ireland and the position of the “Disappeared,” it would be
appropriate to have in place a statutory framework that is consistent with the
essential elements of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009.
1.114
The Commission
provisionally recommends that, for the purpose of the civil law aspects of the
law of missing persons, a statutory framework should be in place which would
provide for a presumption of death in respect of two categories of missing
persons. The first category, where the circumstances of their disappearance
indicates that death is virtually certain, would deal with persons who go
missing in circumstances (whether arising from a civil accident or arising from
a violent incident) where their death is virtually certain given the
circumstances of the disappearance. The second category, where both the
circumstances and length of the disappearance indicate that it is highly
probable that they have died and will not return, would apply where the
disappearance occurred in dangerous circumstances or in other circumstances in
which loss of life may be presumed.
1.115
The Commission
provisionally recommends that, where a person applies to have a presumption of
death order, the following detailed list of matters should be included in a
sworn affidavit:
1. The date when the
supposed deceased was last heard from.
2. Specific evidence
tending to indicate that the individual is dead, such as:
(a) the circumstances surrounding the disappearance,
(b) lack of communication with people who were likely to hear
from him or her, including last known correspondence or communication, and
(c) the length of time since disappearance.
3. Except
in exceptional circumstances, the applicant should advertise for information
concerning the whereabouts of the supposed deceased.
4. Where possible,
the applicant should arrange for search-and-rescue authorities to confirm, by
way of affidavit if possible, that attempts were made to locate the individual,
but were fruitless.
5. The
applicant should set out the full background relating to the disappearance,
including the background as to the supposed deceased’s age and health (including
mental health).
6. The applicant
should also arrange for the details to be corroborated as much as possible by a
family member.
7. The applicant’s
affidavit should set out the next-of-kin entitled to distribution of his assets
on his death.
8. The applicant must
aver their belief that the individual is dead.
1.116
The Commission
also provisionally recommends that, in determining whether a presumption of
death is to be ordered, all the circumstances surrounding the disappearance
must be taken into account, including the following:
(a) the time, location, and
circumstances of the disappearance
(b) the extent and nature of
post-disappearance searches
(c) a prior history of fraud
(d) the presence or absence of a
motive for the missing person to remain alive but disappear
(e) the time between a life
insurance policy being obtained and the subsequent disappearance
(f) facts suggesting the
disappearance was a consequence of foul play and
(g) abandonment of valuable
property.
1.117
Under current law,
there is no clear process available under which those left behind may deal with
the immediate practical issues that may arise when a person goes missing.
This often means that those left behind suffer a range of financial impacts.
Thus:
“Families ‘left behind’ by adults may have severe practical
problems, since bank accounts of a family breadwinner may become inaccessible
and it may prove difficult to claim social security benefits... Practical and
financial problems also continue and may worsen as immediate resources are
exhausted.”[116]
1.118
In this context, the Commission has had the benefit of discussions with
various interested persons leading up to the preparation of this Consultation
Paper. The general view expressed in these discussions is that reform of the
law on missing persons should not only provide for a declaration of presumed
death but also for interim remedies to deal with practical and legal problems
that arise when a person goes missing. Those left behind have stated that they
wish to ensure that financial matters are properly dealt with, though without
having to make the difficult leap to thinking that the missing person may be
dead.
1.119
For example, in the aftermath of the disappearance of Australian man
Daniel Rosewall (discussed above), who had numerous credit card bills and loan
repayments due, his father noted that:
“It would be a huge thing for us to apply for Daniel to be
declared deceased. We think he’s out there somewhere. What if he turns up? As
Daniel’s parents, we can’t do much more to find Daniel. What we can do is look
after his affairs otherwise they will end up in tatters.”[117]
1.120
The practical difficulties expressed to the Commission in these
discussions closely mirror those described in research carried out in England
with families of missing persons.[118]
The case of Englishman, Paul Read, who disappeared in July 2008 after a night
out with friends, provides a similar example. Even though his remains were
found in September 2010, his family encountered numerous problems in the
intervening two and a half year period in their attempts to rearrange financial
arrangements to reflect the fact that Paul had gone missing. His wife noted
that, as she had lost Paul as a source of income, she could not afford the
mortgage and car loan repayments. She also noted that she could not sell the
house or car that were held in both of their names.[119]
1.121
Against this backdrop, numerous submissions have been made to the UK
Houses of Parliament All-Party Parliamentary Group on Runaway and Missing
Children and Adults as to the need for reform. In his submission to the
All-Party Committee, Peter Lawrence, the father of missing person Claudia
Lawrence, noted that it was very difficult to get the relevant companies to
engage with him as to his daughter’s mortgage and car insurance payments. He
noted that some form of administration order would be of great benefit to those
left behind who find themselves in similar circumstances.[120]
1.122
The Commission has
already noted that in a number of states, such as Australia and Canada, there
is a recognition that interim remedies are needed to deal with immediate
issues, such as paying utility bills or rent and mortgage payments; and that
this is especially the case in circumstances where it would not be possible to
establish that it is even highly probable the person is dead, let alone that he
or she is virtually certainly dead.
1.123
The Commission
considers that, given the importance of dealing with such immediate issues, it
is necessary to have in place an appropriate framework to deal with this
situation. The Commission notes that in Australia and Canada these situations
have been dealt with by adding specific provisions for the limited
administration of the property of the missing person into its existing
legislation on adult guardianship. The equivalent of such legislation in
Ireland would be the proposed mental capacity legislation which is scheduled
for publication in Ireland in 2012.[121]
1.124
The Commission
accepts that, by contrast with Australia and Canada, Ireland does not yet have
a modern mental capacity and adult guardianship legislative framework but,
having regard to the commitment that such legislation is well advanced and is
to be published in 2012, it would be appropriate to consider this model for the
purposes of dealing with this aspect of missing persons. The Commission has
therefore concluded that it would be appropriate to include provision in the
proposed mental capacity legislation for limited administration of the property
of the missing person in order to pay essential bills. This would also have the
advantage for those left behind of not being required to apply for a
declaration of presumed death (which given the proofs required would in any
event be unlikely to be granted).
1.125
The Commission is conscious that the full implementation of the
proposed mental capacity legislation may take some years to occur, and that
some suitable interim arrangement should be put in place in the meantime. The
Commission considers in this respect that an application to appoint an interim
administrator to manage the affairs of a missing person is, broadly, comparable
to an application for a limited grant of administration of the estate of a
person. The vast majority of such applications are currently dealt with through
the Probate Office of the High Court. The Commission is aware that the Probate
Office deals with many such probate applications from personal applicants and
has established procedures to facilitate this in an informal and inexpensive
manner. Bearing this in mind, the Commission has provisionally concluded that,
pending the enactment of mental capacity legislation, an application to appoint
an administrator to manage the affairs of a missing person, amounting to a
limited grant of administration of the estate, could be made to the Probate
Office. An applicant would furnish the necessary documentation to the Probate
Office, who would then decide whether an administrator should be appointed,
subject to an appeal to the High Court.
1.126
The Commission
provisionally recommends that it would be appropriate to include provision in
the proposed mental capacity legislation for limited administration of the
property of a missing person, in particular in circumstances in which it could
not be established that a presumption of death order could be made. The Commission also
provisionally recommends that, pending the enactment of mental capacity
legislation, an application to appoint an administrator to manage the affairs
of a missing person, amounting to a limited grant of administration of the
estate, could be made to the Probate Office. An applicant would furnish the
necessary documentation to the Probate Office, who would then decide whether an
administrator should be appointed, subject to an appeal to the High Court.
2
2.01
In Chapter 1, the
Commission provisionally recommended that legislation should be enacted along
the lines of comparable provisions in Australia[122]
and Canada[123] which
would provide for an application to appoint an administrator to manage the
affairs of a missing person on an interim basis. The Commission now turns to
examine in this Chapter the details of such legislation. In Part B, the
Commission discusses the relevant legislation in Australia and then turns in
Part C to discuss the comparable legislation in Canada. In Part D, the
Commission sets out its conclusions and provisional recommendations for reform.
2.02
As already noted in
Chapter 1, in New South Wales,[124]
Victoria[125] and the
Australian Capital Territory,[126]
adult guardianship legislation (the equivalent of the proposed mental capacity
legislation which is scheduled for publication in Ireland in 2012)[127]
has been extended to provide for an administrator to be appointed to manage the
affairs of a person where this person is missing and is not presumed dead.
2.03
The granting of a
declaration and order to have an administrator appointed to manage the affairs
of a missing person is a serious matter. This was made clear by Campbell J in
the New South Wales case Re Gell:
“The fact that
the declaration and order is made when the missing person is not in a position
to present evidence or tell the Court his or her views about the appointment,
and that the declaration and order can irretrievably affect his or her property,
means that the Court is unlikely to be satisfied by slight proofs.”[128]
2.04
An application for the
appointment of an administrator to manage the affairs of the missing person is
determined according to a two-stage process. Firstly, the person must fall into
a category of a “missing person”, which is discussed below. Second, in addition to
this:
“ordinarily evidence would be needed of
the circumstances in which the person has disappeared, including his or her
condition during the period immediately before the disappearance, and material
which casts light on any motive the person may have had to disappear, or on any
other possible cause there might be for his or her disappearance.”[129]
2.05
Thus, the mere fact that a person has not been seen by people who
would ordinarily see him or her is not enough to show that that person is a
“missing person” because this would also be consistent with the person being on
a holiday. The Court stated that more context would be
needed to conclude that the person is indeed a “missing person.”[130]
2.06
Section 60AB(2) of the NSW Guardianship and
Administration Act 1986 provides in this respect, without defining what constitutes a “missing person”,
that a number of criteria be met:
“(a) it is not known whether the person is alive; and
(b) reasonable efforts have been made
to find the person; and
(c) for at least 90 days, the person
has not contacted–
(i) anyone who lives at the person’s
last-known home address; or
(ii) any relative or friend of the
person with whom the person is likely to communicate.”[131]
2.07
In relation to (a)
above — where there is no knowledge of whether the person is alive — the courts
have held that this refers to those:
“...people who ordinarily would be expected to have seen, or to
have heard from, or of, the person. Given that missing people are ordinarily
reported to the police, who then come under an obligation to find out what they
can about the whereabouts of the person, in practice that will usually include
also that part of the police force whose task it is to investigate the whereabouts of missing
people.”[132]
2.08
The New South Wales
Supreme Court has held that the results of police inquiries “go a long way and
perhaps all the way” in proving this. Evidence of a physical search in the area
where the person disappeared, and failure to find, or hear news of the finding
of the dead body may also be appropriate in the circumstances to satisfy the
requirement.[133]
2.09
Therefore, in order to
satisfy this criterion, it must be shown that individuals such as the missing
person’s close family or friends do not know if the missing person is alive. In
addition, the Courts may look to evidence that the missing person’s unit of the
local police force could not establish if the missing person is alive or dead.
2.10
As to “reasonable
efforts” to find the person, the courts require evidence of what efforts have
been made to locate the person.[134]
For example, as it is the police who often have the requisite knowledge and
expertise in locating missing persons, in Re Gell[135]
the Court was of the opinion that “it would be a most unusual case for
the Court to be satisfied that a person was missing if the police had not been
informed of the disappearance.” In Re Flint[136] the Court accepted as evidence the fact that the mother
of the missing person had made a report to the police, with the police
following the usual procedure in tracing missing persons. The Court also took
into consideration that the disappearance of the person, and the concerns of
his parents, had received widespread media circulation. Finally, the Court
accepted evidence that the Salvation Army (who have experience in dealing with
missing person cases) were requested by the missing person’s family to search
for him.[137]
2.11
The question of what constitutes “reasonable efforts” was also discussed
in Re Gell,[138] where the
Court held that, while it depends on the particular facts of the case, in
general taking actions such as seeking publicity, going to places where the
missing person frequented and registering with the relevant missing person
organisations would be taken as “reasonable efforts.”[139]
In providing evidence that reasonable efforts have been made to locate the
missing person, the Court in Re Gell stated that the tender of an original
letter from the missing person’s unit of the relevant police force which stated
that search activities had been unsuccessful would be sufficient.[140]
2.12
The Australian courts
have noted that the purpose of this provision is to identify the people with
whom the person would be likely to communicate with if he or she were indeed
alive, had been missing, and had access to ordinary means of communication.[141]
It is not meant to require an applicant prove that all relatives or friends of
the missing person have not heard from the missing person since the disappearance
occurred.
2.13
The court will also be
conscious of situations where the person may deliberately disappear and
therefore no contact would be made with those likely to have heard from the
missing person. If the court believes that this is the case arising from the
particular facts, it acknowledges that this proof is based on the assumption
that the person did not deliberately chose to disappear. Therefore, evidence to
satisfy this proof may not be required by the Court before granting the appointment
of an administrator.[142]
2.14
Secondly, once the
legislative definition of “missing” is satisfied, they must also meet further
criteria. For example, the following factors that must be met are outlined by
the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 in Victoria:
“(a) [the missing person] usually resides in Victoria; and
(b) while
the person is missing there is, or is likely to be, a need for a decision in
relation to the person’s financial matters or property; and
(c) it is
in the best interests of the missing person for a person to be appointed to
administer their estate while they are missing”[143]
2.15
Paragraph (c) indicates that an administrator will only be appointed if
it is in the best interests of the missing person; and this is also the case in
New South Wales. By contrast, the corresponding provision in the Australian
Capital Territory, the Guardian and Management of Property Act 1991, requires
that the missing person’s interests would be “significantly adversely
affected” if a guardian is not appointed.[144]
It could be argued that the Australian Capital Territory demands a higher standard
of need on behalf the missing person’s interests to be first demonstrated, than
the “best interests” standard currently in place in Victoria and New South
Wales.
2.16
When an application is made for an administrator to be appointed to
manage the affairs of a missing person, the relevant Court or Tribunal will
then have to decide who is to be appointed as the administrator. In general,
the best interests of the missing person will be taken into account, in
addition to ensuring that there are no conflicts of interests between the
missing person and the administrator.[145]
For example in the Guardian and Administration Act 1986, the
administrator must be “suitable.” Section 47(2) of the Guardian and
Administration Act 1986 provides that the Victoria Civil and Administrative
Tribunal determines this on the basis of:
“(a) the wishes of the proposed represented person, so far as
they can be ascertained; and
(b) the compatibility of the person
proposed as administrator with the proposed represented person and with the
guardian (if any) of the proposed represented person; and
(c) whether the person was a member of
the Tribunal as constituted for a proceeding under this Act.”
2.17
In addition, the Court or Tribunal must ensure that there are no
conflicts of interest between the administrator and the missing person.
Therefore, in general a person who is close to the missing person and is
trusted to act in the best interests of the person, for example, a relative or
close friend, is appointed as the administrator.
2.18
On the bringing of an application to have an administrator appointed,
notice is generally provided to persons who may have interest in the affairs of
the missing person. For example, the Guardianship and Administration Act
1986 requires that notice is provided to the following persons:
“(a) the nearest relative available of the person in respect of
whom the application is made;
(b) the primary carer (if any) of the
person in respect of whom the application is made;
(c) the Public Advocate;
(d) any guardian of the person in
respect of whom the application is made;
(e) any person who has advised the
Tribunal of an interest in the person in respect of whom the application is
made or in his or her estate.”[146]
2.19
In terms of bringing an application to have an administrator appointed,
a form is filled out by the applicant which specifies
the need for the administrator to be appointed. In Victoria a statement of the
fortnightly income and expenditure of the missing person and a list of assets
and liabilities is also provided. In New South Wales, while there is no
specific rule that requires that an affidavit outlines the nature and amount of
the property of the missing person, or the nature of the relevant business
affairs, the courts have stated that it would be:
“hard to see how the Court could be satisfied that it was in the
best interests of the missing person to have a manager appointed of the estate,
or whether it was more in the best interests of that person to have a manager
appointed over the whole, rather than some part of the estate, without being
informed of those matters in at least broad outline.”[147]
2.20
Therefore in presenting an application to have an administrator
appointed to manage the affairs of a missing person, the Court must be
satisfied that the administrator would act in the best interests of the missing
person. It is also generally accepted that the administrator will provide a
statement of the assets and liabilities of the missing person to the Court, so
they can best assess what part, if not the whole, of the missing person’s
affairs is to be managed.
2.21
The purpose of the
legislation is to permit a limited use of the property of a missing person
after 90 days absence. Under the legislation, an administrator is appointed to
manage the affairs of the missing person. In the Victoria and the Australian
Capital Territory, the administrator is appointed initially for a two
year period, but this may be extended for a further two years.[148] The powers given to the
administrator are the same as the powers as if it is the missing person making
the decisions.[149]
2.22
In granting the order
to appoint an administrator, the relevant authority must specify the exact
powers given to the administrator. It must also state whether all, or part
only, of the interests of the missing person’s interests are to be managed.[150]
The kind of decisions that the administrator may make must be in the best
interests of the missing person. In the Australian Capital Territory, the Guardianship
and Management of Property Act 1991 outlines a number of key decision
making principles that the administrator must adhere to:
“(a) the
protected person’s wishes, as far as they can be worked out, must be given
effect to, unless making the decision in accordance with the wishes is likely
to significantly adversely affect the protected person’s interests;
(b) if giving
effect to the protected person’s wishes is likely to significantly adversely
affect the person’s interests—the decision-maker must give effect to the
protected person’s wishes as far as possible without significantly adversely
affecting the protected person’s interests;
(c) if the protected person’s wishes cannot be given effect to
at all — the interests of the protected person must be promoted;
(d) the protected person’s life (including the person’s lifestyle)
must be interfered with to the smallest extent necessary”.[151]
2.23
These general
principles, while explicitly stated in the relevant legislation of the
Australian Capital Territory, are also provided for by the legal obligation
placed on the administrator to act in the best interests of the missing person
in New South Wales and Victoria.[152]
The Australian courts have held that the best interests can be interpreted
as:
“[the] preservation and maintenance of
the property of the missing person, and dealing with the business affairs of
the missing person in a way best calculated to preserve, maintain, or possibly
enhance the assets of the missing person.”[153]
2.24
In more specific terms,
the administrator will be granted the power to make the decisions, which may
include the following:
·
The execution of documents other than a will.
·
Collect, receive and recover income
·
Pay any debts and settle any demand against the estate
·
With consent, sell, exchange, partition or
convert property
·
Pay a sum for maintenance of the missing person’s dependants[154]
2.25
Should it be discovered that the missing person is alive, dead, or
presumed dead, the relevant court is under an obligation to remove the
administration order on the property. [155]
2.26
In Re Rosewall (Guardianship)[156] Mr Rosewall, who disappeared in January 2010 after
failing to attend an appointment,[157]
was declared a missing person in December 2010 under Part 5A of the Victoria Guardianship
and Administration Act 1986 Act.
2.27
In the aftermath of Mr. Rosewall’s disappearance a number of practical
problems arose. Firstly, his parents were aware of a number of debts that had
fallen due, in particular one debt which would accrue substantial interest if
not paid in the near future.[158] Secondly,
Mr. Rosewall had rented an apartment with his girlfriend. However, after his
disappearance, his girlfriend could not afford to pay the rent on her own. She
had since terminated the lease on the property. In light of this, Mr.
Rosewall’s parents made numerous unsuccessful attempts to redirect their son’s
post from the property, so that they could remain aware of any outstanding
debts. However, without proof of their son’s death, Australia Post would not
redirect the post, due to its privacy policy.[159]
In summary, as the Court noted:
“Understandably, his family is concerned that there may be
outstanding debts that they are not aware of. They are anxious to ensure that
all Daniel’s financial affairs are kept in order while he is missing.”[160]
2.28
In the hearing at the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Mr.
Rosewall’s parents submitted evidence that a number of bills had become
overdue, with substantial interest about to accrue on one in particular. They
also demonstrated the difficulty in attempting to redirect their son’s post. In
accepting this evidence, the Tribunal also considered the family solicitor’s
evidence that addressed the efforts that had been made by the police, combined
with numerous police media releases.[161]
2.29
The Tribunal, taking this into consideration, held that it was in the
best interests of the missing person to appoint an administrator and appointed
Mr. Rosewall’s father. The Tribunal permitted the following kind of decisions
to be made with regard to Mr. Rosewall’s assets:
“(a) accessing represented person’s
bank accounts and applying funds for the purposes of payment of represented
person’s debts
(b) authorising the deposit of any
monies owed to the represented person (including any tax refund payable for the
year 2009-10) into the represented person’s bank account/s
(c) effecting a mail redirection with
Australia Post of the represented person’s mail to the administrator’s address
(d) arranging the sale of the
represented person’s motor vehicle, a Ford Falcon BAXR6 sedan, 2003, and
depositing the proceeds into the represented person’s account
(e) arranging the sale of the represented
person’s washing machine and depositing the proceeds into the represented
person’s account.”[162]
2.30
The Tribunal also ordered that Mr. Rosewall’s father submit a Financial
Statement and Plan and the annual examination of the accounts of the missing
person.[163]
2.31
The Rosewall case provides a clear example of the detailed
elements of the Australian approach to the appointment of administrators to
manage the affairs of a missing person. The order is only granted where, due to
a present or likely need for a decision to be made in relation to a missing
person’s financial matters, it is in their best interests to appoint an administrator.
The case also highlights that it is usually close family members or friends who
bring the application, and are subsequently appointed as administrators to act
in the best interests of the missing person.
2.32
In Ontario[164]
and Quebec,[165] provision
is made for a similar scheme under which a tutor (in Quebec) or a committee (in
Ontario) is appointed to manage the affairs of a missing person or “absentee.”
The object of the legislation is to ensure that the estate of an
absentee is administered and not left to waste.[166]
2.33
Under the Quebec Civil
Code, “any interested person,” including the Public Curator or a
creditor of the absentee, may apply for the institution of tutorship to the
absentee.’[167] By contrast with this broad
provision, the Absentees Act in Ontario provides for a more specific
list of persons:
“(a) the Attorney General;
(b) any one or more of the next of kin
of the alleged absentee;
(c) the person to whom the alleged
absentee is married;
(d) the person with whom the alleged
absentee was living in a conjugal relationship outside marriage immediately
before the absentee’s disappearance;
(e) a creditor; or
(f) any other person.”[168]
2.34
The Ontario courts have
interpreted the term “next of kin” to mean the mother, father, children,
brothers, sisters, spouse or common law spouse of the missing person. In the
absence of any of them, “next of kin” would also comprise those entitled to
share in the estate of the missing person were he or she to die intestate.[169] Pursuant to
section 1 of the Absentee Act 1990 an absentee is defined as:
“a person who, having had his or her
usual place of residence or domicile in Ontario, has disappeared, whose whereabouts
is unknown and as to whom there is no knowledge as to whether he or she is
alive or dead.”[170]
2.35
Unlike the position in Australia, this is a broader definition of
missing person, with no minimum time period of 90 days absence before an
application can be brought. However, the courts have interpreted this
definition by setting a number of limits, including that the Act is not
intended to cover cases in which a person, for his or her own purpose, conceals
him or herself by faking suicide.[171]
2.36
The legislation also requires that a due and satisfactory inquiry be
carried out into the disappearance of the person if they are to be deemed an absentee.
The courts assess whether this has been satisfied by asking a number of
questions, such as those posed by Quinn J in Kamboj v Kamboj,[172] where a man called Ashwani Kamboj disappeared:
“(a) Does Ashwani have next of kin or
other relatives or friends in India? If so, do they have relevant information?
(b) Are the applicants the only children of Ashwani?
(c) Does Ashwani have other next of kin or relatives in Ontario
or in the United States? If so, do they have relevant information?
(d) Does Ashwani have friends or acquaintances in Ontario or in
the United States? If so, do they have relevant information?
(e) Are there restaurants, bars or other establishments in
Niagara Falls or elsewhere in Ontario that Ashwani frequented? If so, have
inquiries been made for relevant information?
(f) Did he belong to any clubs, religious, community or social
organizations? If so, have inquiries been made for relevant information?
(g) Did he have a family doctor? If so, have inquiries been made
for relevant information?
(h) Has a notice been published in a local newspaper, containing
his picture and soliciting information in respect of his whereabouts?
(i) Did his disappearance attract media attention?
(j) Did Ashwani have a will?
(k) Did he have any creditors? If so, do they have relevant
information?”[173]
2.37
In assessing whether a due and adequate inquiry was made into the
disappearance of Mr. Kamboj, the Court noted that the affidavit filed by the
applicants was a mere “regurgitation” of the police report, and that little
inquiries had been made as to ascertain the whereabouts of Mr. Kamboj.[174]
The Court therefore rejected the claim for an appointment of an administrator
to manage the affairs of the missing man.
2.38
In addition to satisfying the Court as to due and satisfactory
inquiries, the applicant must also prepare and deliver to the Court a
management plan for the property of the missing person. This plan details the
income, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the missing person and how the
committee plans the property will be used to pay maintenance, bills, and other
outgoings arising from the estate. In considering this, the Court will assess
the applicant’s ability to manage the property in line with the proposed
management plan. For example in Re Quang Lu,[175]
the Court held that:
“While the applicant's evidence does not disclose her experience
in managing property, the value of Mr. Lu’s known property is modest and the
property consists of assets typically managed by families. The applicant’s plan
to manage the property to pay for their daughter’s living and educational
expenses reflects the evidence that historically Mr. Lu fully provided for his
daughter's financial needs. Consequently, I am satisfied that an order should
go appointing the applicant as committee of the property of Mr. Lu for the
purpose of securing its custody, and ensuring its due care and management in
accordance with the terms of the management plan filed with the application.”[176]
2.39
As under the Australian law discussed above, if the absentee is found to
be dead, presumed dead or alive subsequent to the tutor or committee being
appointed, the Court must then revoke the administration order on the estate.[177]
However, unlike in Australia (where there the administrator is appointed for an
initial two year period, and may be reappointed for up to two years after that)[178]
in both Quebec and Ontario the relevant legislation does not provide for a
maximum appointment period for the administrator.
2.40
As discussed above, there are two approaches to providing a definition
of missing persons. In Australian legislation, a more specific definition is
provided, while in Quebec and Ontario, a broader definition is provided for in
the relevant legislation. The Commission is of the opinion that, while both approaches
have a similar result, the Australian approach is more desirable as it provides
more clarity in terms of those applying for orders under the proposed law.
2.41
The Commission also considers that the appointment of an administrator to
manage the affairs of a missing person should not be granted easily. The
Commission agrees in this respect with the need to meet the type of criteria
set out by Quinn J in the Canadian case Kamboj v Kamboj[179]
(a) Does the missing person have next
of kin or other relatives or friends in his home place? If so, do they have
relevant information?
(b) Are the applicants the only relatives of the missing person?
(c) Does the missing person have other next of kin or relatives
abroad? If so, do they have relevant information?
(d) Does the missing person have other close friends or
acquaintances? If so, do they have relevant information?
(e) Are there restaurants, bars or other establishments in the
locality or elsewhere that the missing person frequented? If so, have inquiries
been made for relevant information?
(f) Did the missing person belong to any clubs, religious,
community or social organizations? If so, have inquiries been made for relevant
information?
(g) Did the missing person have a family doctor? If so, have
inquiries been made for relevant information?
(h) Has a notice been published in a local newspaper, containing
the missing person’s picture and soliciting information in respect of his or
her whereabouts?
(i) Did the disappearance attract media attention?
(j) Did the missing person have a will?
(k) Did the missing person have any creditors? If so, do they
have relevant information?
2.42
The Commission has accordingly concluded, and provisionally recommends,
that an order to appoint an administrator to administer a missing person’s
property may only be made where: (a) it is not known whether the person is
alive; (b) reasonable efforts have been made to find the person; and (c) for at
least 90 days, the person has not contacted (i) anyone who lives at the
person’s last-known home address or (ii) any relative or friend of the person
with whom the person is likely to communicate.
2.43
The Commission provisionally recommends that an order to appoint an
administrator to administer a missing person’s property may only be made where:
(a) it is not known whether the person is alive; (b) reasonable efforts have
been made to find the person; and (c) for at least 90 days, the person has not
contacted (i) anyone who lives at the person’s last-known home address or (ii)
any relative or friend of the person with whom the person is likely to
communicate.
2.44
In Australian law any person may apply to be an administrator,[180]
but in general the Court will appoint someone who is close to the missing
person, for example, a relative or close friend. The courts will make this
decision with regard to the wishes of the missing person, so far as they can be
ascertained. A similar broad provision is provided for in the Quebec Civil
Code, where “any interested person, including the Public Curator or a creditor”
may apply to obtain an administration on the affairs of the missing person.[181]
2.45
The Commission notes
that the persons who are most likely to apply are spouses, civil partners,
children, parents, or even close friends of the missing person. Other parties
such as insurance companies, employees, or the State may also have a legitimate
interest in bringing an application to have the missing person’s estate
administered. Indeed, it is clear that this group of people are also likely to
be involved in any application to have a person declared presumed dead. In that
respect, the Commission’s discussion in this section also deals with that part
of the reform proposals (which are discussed in Chapter 3, below).
2.46
Under current law, the
common law presumption of 7 years absence requires that there has been no
communication by the missing person with those who are likely to have heard
from them. This would include family members and close friends, but has also
been interpreted broadly by the courts to include a missing person’s
stockbrokers.[182]
2.47
The Council of Europe
2009 Recommendation on Missing Persons states that “any person demonstrating a
legitimate interest” should be permitted to bring an application for a
presumption of death order and that this would include “the spouse or
registered partner, persons with an inheritance-related interest, or another
financial interest, in the declaration of legal presumption of death, such as
creditors.”[183]
2.48
The comparable term
“interested persons” has been adopted by many countries. This focuses on the
“interest” of the party bringing the application in the matters of the missing
person who is alleged to have died. For example, in Northern Ireland, a spouse
or civil partner[184] or a
person with “sufficient interest”[185]
may bring an application.[186] A similar
provision for spouses is provided for in Scotland, supplemented by a provision
for “any interested person” to bring an application.[187]
This approach is also reflected in New Brunswick,[188]
while in Quebec, the Civil Code provides:
“A declaratory judgment of death may be pronounced on the
application of any interested person, including the Public Curator or the
Minister of Revenue as provisional administrator of property, seven years after
disappearance”[189]
2.49
Thus the Quebec civil
code explicitly acknowledges that the State, through the Public Curator or
Minister for Revenue, may have a legitimate interest in bringing a presumption
of death order against a missing person. This can also be seen in the Irish
case Re Doherty. Here the State, through the Minister for Finance, was
found to have a legitimate interest under the doctrine of bona vacantia,[190]
which comes into effect when a person dies intestate. This allowed the State sufficient
interest to bring a presumption of death application concerning Mr. Doherty.
2.50
In Ontario, the Declaration of Death Act 2002 provides for a
non-exhaustive list of “interested persons” who can apply for a presumption of
death order, including:
“(a) a person named as executor or
estate trustee in the individual’s will,
(b) a person who may be entitled to
apply to be appointed administrator of the individual’s estate on intestacy,
(c) the individual’s spouse,
(d) the individual’s next of kin,
(e) the individual’s guardian or
attorney for personal care or property... ,
(f) a person who is in possession of
property owned by the individual,
(g) if there is a contract of life
insurance or group insurance insuring the individual’s life,
(i) the
insurer, and
(ii) any
potential claimant under the contract, and
(h) if the individual has been declared
an absentee under the Absentees Act, the committee of his or her estate”[191]
2.51
In conclusion, there are two approaches to defining “interested
persons”. In Northern Ireland, Scotland and New Brunswick, legislation provides
for a broad provision allowing “any interested persons” to apply for a
declaration of presumed death order. In Quebec, a detailed description of
“interested persons” who may make an application for a presumption of death
order has been enacted.
2.52
The Commission has concluded that an approach which provides a detailed,
non-exhaustive list of persons who may bring an application is more desirable.
This is because it provides a level of clarity for those left behind who may
wish to bring a claim.
2.53
The Commission considers that it would be appropriate to set out a
non-prescriptive list that matches the actual experience in the jurisdictions
already discussed (close family being the most usual persons appointed), but
allowing sufficient flexibility to provide for unusual cases. The Commission
has accordingly concluded, and provisionally recommends, that the following
persons may apply to be appointed as the administrator of the affairs of a
missing person: (a) the missing person’s spouse or civil partner; (b) the
missing person’s cohabitant; (c) any other next of kin of the missing person;
(d) a creditor or (e) any other person (including, where relevant, the State)
with a sufficient interest. As already discussed, the Commission has also
concluded that this should also be the list of persons who may apply for a
declaration of presumed death (discussed in detail in Chapter 3, below).
2.54
The Commission provisionally recommends that the following persons may
apply to be appointed as the administrator of the estate or property of a
missing person: (a) the missing person’s spouse or civil partner; (b) the
missing person’s cohabitant; (c) any other next of kin of the missing person;
(d) a creditor; or (e) any other person (including, where relevant, the State)
with a sufficient interest. The Commission provisionally recommends that
this should also be the list of persons who may apply for a declaration of
presumed death.
2.55
In Australia, the administrator must act in the best interests of the
missing person, taking into account as far as possible the wishes of the
represented person. The legislation in New South Wales, Victoria and the
Australian Capital Territories all permit a limited and specific use of the
property of the missing person for a two year period, but this may be extended
for a further two years.[192] The
specific uses apply to:
·
The payment of the debts and engagements of,
and otherwise for the benefit of, the missing person
·
The maintenance and benefit of dependents of
the missing person
·
The care and management of the estate of the
missing person[193]
2.56
This is similar to the situation in Quebec where its legislation
provides for the court to fix the amounts that it is expedient to allocate to the
expenses of the marriage or civil union, to the maintenance of the family or to
the payment of the obligation of support of the absentee.[194] Similarly, in Ontario,
the Absentees Act 1990 provides for the administrator to act for the
incapable person’s benefit.[195]
2.57
The Commission notes that both the Australian and Canadian
approaches are similar in that they provide for a limited and specified use of
property of the missing person for the benefit of that person. The Commission
has therefore provisionally concluded that an administrator would have limited
and specified powers to administer the affairs of the missing person for a
period of up to two years, which can be extended for a further two years.
2.58
The Commission provisionally recommends that an administrator have
limited and specified powers to administer the affairs of the missing person
for a period of up to two years, which can be extended for a further two years.
3
3.01
In Chapter 1, the
Commission provisionally recommended that legislation should be enacted along
the lines of comparable presumption of death legislation in other countries,
such as the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009. The
Commission now turns to examine in this Chapter the details of such
legislation. In Part B, the Commission discusses the limited nature of existing
presumed death orders made by the High Court. In Part C, the
Commission sets out its conclusions and provisional recommendations for reform,
including the key elements of the presumption of death legislation.
3.02
When a person dies and
they are not missing, their assets become subject to the law of succession
which permits the distribution of their assets in accordance with the Succession
Act 1965. The 1965 Act provides for the estate of the deceased to devolve
on and vest in the appointed personal representatives.[196]
A grant of administration is then obtained, which allows for the distribution
of the assets, if any, to the relevant beneficiaries. The registration of death
also allows for those left behind to obtain a death
certificate for the deceased. This enables those left behind to deal with
practical matters such as the closure of relevant bank accounts, or the
transfer of any jointly owned assets (for example, a house or car).
3.03
Under the current law, in cases where a missing person is believed to
have died, a declaration of presumed death may be made by the High Court.[197]
The Court does not pronounce
on the death of the person to the estate of whom it declares presumed dead, unlike
where a coroner’s declaration of death in effect inquest authorises the General
Registrar for Births, Deaths and Marriages to register the death of the missing
person (in accordance with the Civil Registration Act 2004). Instead, if the High Court is
satisfied that the evidence points to a reasonable presumption of death, it
makes an order declaring presumed death.[198]
This order permits the grant of administration for the estate of the missing
person only. The making of an order for presumed death does not permit the
death to be registered. This means that no death certificate can be obtained.
It is therefore unclear how the practical issues such as the closing of bank
accounts of the missing person who is presumed dead, maintenance of dependents
and the payment of creditors are resolved. Similarly, as discussed below, the
status of any pre-existing marriage or civil partnership is unclear.
3.04
It is therefore clear
that a gap in the legal consequences exists between situations where a person
dies in normal circumstances and where a missing person is believed to have
died. As discussed below, the Commission is of the view that if the facts
surrounding the disappearance of a person indicate that the missing person may
have died, those left behind should be permitted to obtain a registration of
death. In the first category of cases described in Chapter 2, where it is
proved that the missing person is virtually certain to have died, those left
behind should be permitted to obtain a registration of death. In second
category of cases described in Chapter 2, where death is highly probable
due to the circumstances in which the person disappeared or as a result of a
long-term absence, those left
behind should be permitted to obtain a registration of presumed death. This
would permit those left behind to obtain a death certificate or presumption of
death certificate for the missing person.
3.05
The second issue concerns the waiting period before an application can
be made. As discussed above, a number of practical and legal issues arise after
the death of a person. These are resolved by the issuing of a death certificate
in a short period after the person’s death. Under the current law in Ireland, while the common law rule concerning presumption of death suggests that persons
may have to wait up to 7 years for a presumed death order in the High Court,
this is in fact not always the case. Thus, in cases where death is virtually
certain, such as in the Irish case In the Goods of Freytag,[199]
an order of presumed death
may be made in a short period of time after their disappearance. The 7 year
rule thus applies primarily to other cases of missing persons, where death is
highly probable. In these categories, those left behind must wait for 7 years
absence before bringing a claim before the High Court to have a person declared
presumed dead.
3.06
The Commission notes
that the 7 year rule is long-established and, indeed, is extremely well-known
among those who deal with the issue of missing persons in Ireland, which was
confirmed in the discussions the Commission held with individuals and groups
leading to the publication of this Consultation Paper. The 7 year rule has also
been used by the Oireachtas, albeit in a limited context, in section 18 of the Land
and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 and been used as a reference point for
social welfare purposes.[200] Similarly,
it has in effect been placed on a statutory footing in Scotland[201]
and Northern Ireland.[202]
3.07
The Commission notes
that, in a number of other countries, the waiting period before missing
persons may be declared presumed dead has been reduced or gradated according to
the probability of the death of the missing person. For example, under the
German Verschollenheitsgesetz 1939 (the Disappearance Act), a number of periods
are set depending on the circumstances of the disappearance. They range from
three months for a disappearance during a war to six months for a disappearance
while at sea.[203] The German legislation also makes provision for a waiting
period of 25 years for persons who were under 25 at the time of their
disappearance, in circumstances that were not dangerous to their lives.[204]
Similarly, some states in the United States of America operate a much lower
time period; New York[205] has a 3
year waiting period and Georgia[206]
a four year waiting period.[207]
3.08
The Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Missing Persons also takes
account of the circumstances of the disappearance and the related probability
of the death of the missing person. The Recommendation states:[208]
“(1). Where, in the
light of all the circumstances, the death of the missing person can be taken as
certain, the lodging of the request [for a declaration of presumed death]
should preferably be possible without a waiting period.
4(2). Where the
circumstances of disappearance of the missing person are such that it is
reasonable to conclude that his or her death is likely, the time which must
have elapsed from the disappearance, or from the
receipt of the last news that the person was alive, for lodging the request
should preferably be one year at the most.
4(3). Where
the death of the missing person is uncertain, the time which must have elapsed
from the disappearance, or from the receipt of the last news that the person
was alive, for lodging the request should preferably be seven years at the
most.”
3.09
This gradated approach is consistent with the actual application of the
existing common law rule. As already discussed, this can lead to a declaration of
presumed death within months where the death is virtually certain, as in In the Goods of
Freytag[209]
(3 months after disappearance). The Commission also notes that the 2009
Recommendation also refers to a 7 year rule, albeit “preferably... seven years
at the most.” While the 2009 Recommendation indicates, therefore, a preference
to regard the 7 year rule as an outward limit, the Commission considers that
there is merit in retaining the well-known reference point of the 7 year rule,
bearing in mind always that it does not require in all cases that 7
years have passed since disappearance. The Commission also notes in this
respect that the 2009 Recommendation also requires member states to have regard
to maintaining a fair balance between the interests of those concerned,
including the person whose presumed death is declared. Thus, the maintenance of
a long-established rule can be seen as respecting this general principle.
3.10
The Commission’s categorisation of missing persons into two, namely,
where death is virtually certain and, where death is highly probable due to the circumstances in which
the person disappeared, are based on a sliding scale of probability of death,
which reflects the likelihood of the missing person being located alive. These
categorisations allow for the separation of application processes and the
gradating of time periods, from a shorter period where death is virtually
certain, to a longer period where the person is missing for a number of years.
It also allows for the separation of legal and practical consequences according
to the probability of locating the person alive. This also reflects the
essential elements of the 2009 Council of Europe Recommendation.
3.11
As the law currently
stands, in cases where death is virtually certain and the body of the missing
person is believed to have been either lost at sea or destroyed in a fire, section
23 of the Coroners Act 1962 allows for a coroner, after conducting an
inquest, to issue a declaration of death. This in turns allows the Registrar of
Births, Deaths and Marriages to issue a death certificate for the missing
person. The Commission’s provisional recommendations in Chapter 1 propose that
the category of where death is virtually certain would be wider than the
limited situations recognised in section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962
3.12
The Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Missing Persons recommends
that there should, in effect, be no waiting period required where death is
virtually certain. This approach is, in effect, already in place under existing
practice in Ireland, as indicated by the decision in In the Goods of Freytag[210]
(declaration made 3 months after disappearance). It is also mirrored in
legislation in numerous countries; for example, the Netherlands,[211]
Northern Ireland[212] and those
countries who have implemented the 1966 ICCS Athens Convention allow for
the immediate declaration of presumed death in situations where death of the
missing person is virtually certain.
3.13
Therefore, in cases where death is virtually certain, the Commission
considers that there is no reason to require those left behind to wait any
longer than is necessary before the missing person’s death can be registered.
Similarly, the Commission also considers that such an application could be made
to a coroner, which would involve, in effect, an extension of section 23 of the
Coroners Act 1962, which already envisages an inquest involving a
missing person, albeit in limited circumstances. Under this proposed reform,
where the coroner is satisfied that death is virtually certain, a declaration
of death can be made and this would allow the Registrar of Births, Deaths and
Marriages to issue a death certificate. The Commission emphasises that the
coroner would be acting on relevant proofs that establish that death is
virtually certain. In this respect, an applicant would be required to bring to
the coroner the detailed material which the Commission has already recommended
is required before a presumption of death order may be made;[213]
and that the coroner would also be required to have regard to the factors which
the Commission has also recommended should be involved in any such decision.[214]
Once the coroner makes the finding that death has occurred, this, in turn,
would authorise the applicant to register the death in the Register of Deaths
provided for under the Civil Registration Act 2004. This would also
allow for the standard legal consequences of death to arise within a short time
period after the disappearance of the person, while also helping those left
behind deal with the practical issues that arise.
3.14
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in situations where
death is virtually certain, there should be no minimum waiting period before an
application can be made to obtain a declaration of presumed death. The
Commission also provisionally recommends that this declaration could be made by
a coroner and would be identical to a standard declaration of death; that it
would authorise the applicant to register the death in the Register of Deaths
provided for under the Civil Registration Act 2004; and that it would have the
identical legal consequences that arise on the death of a person.
3.15
The Commission considers that in the category of missing persons
where death is highly probable a declaration of “presumed death” would be more
appropriate and that a separate register of presumed deaths should be
established in line with the approach in comparable legislation such as the Presumption
of Death (Scotland) Act 1977 and the Presumption of Death (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009. This is because there is a greater possibility that the
person may return in some cases, and it is therefore preferable that the record
of such presumed deaths be separate from the standard register of deaths.
3.16
The Commission is of the view that, to facilitate such orders, a
register of presumed deaths, distinct from the register of deaths, should be
established by the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages under the Civil
Registration Act 2004. This would be comparable to the position in Northern
Ireland where, under section 15 of the Presumption of Death Act (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009, a separate register of Presumed Deaths has been
established.[215] This
declaration of presumed death would have the same effects as a standard
declaration of death.
3.17
The Commission accepts that it may be difficult to differentiate clearly
in all instances, at least initially, between cases where death is certain and
where death is highly probable. It may be that, under the Commission’s proposed
reforms, an application might be made initially at least to a coroner claiming
that the circumstances suggest that death is certain. Whether the coroner
accepts such an application would, of course, be a matter for the coroner to
determine. The Commission considers that, in any event, this does not create an
insurmountable problem. This is because the coroner would have available to him
or her the detailed material which the Commission has already recommended is
required before a presumption of death order may be made;[216]
and that the coroner would also be required to have regard to the factors which
the Commission has also recommended should be involved in any such decision.[217]
In this respect, a coroner might, in some instances, come to the conclusion
that the application does not come within the category of missing person where
death is certain.
3.18
The Commission has concluded that, where death is highly probable,
but not certain, it is preferable that a declaration of presumed death be made
by High Court. The Court will, of course, be acting on the same essential
proofs and would have regard to the same factors, but would be entitled to
conclude that death may nonetheless be presumed. Once these proofs are
satisfied, the High Court will issue a declaration of presumed death which
would then allow the applicant to apply for an entry on the Register of Presumed
Deaths and the issuing of a certificate of presumed death. The Commission has
also concluded that this certificate of presumed death would have the same
effect as a standard death certificate and would allow for the standard
consequences of death to arise, such as the grant of administration of the
estate, and it would have the same effect on any marriage or civil partnership.
3.19
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in situations where
death is highly probable, a declaration of presumed death may be made in the
High Court; that the declaration would authorise the applicant to register the
death in a Register of Presumed Deaths to be established for this purpose under
the Civil Registration Act 2004; and that it would have the identical legal
consequences that arise on the death of a person.
3.20
The remaining issue to
be considered in this aspect of the Commission’s proposals is whether the
common law 7 year rule should remain the relevant reference period for
determining whether it should be presumed that a person has died. The
Commission notes that the 7 year rule is long-established and, indeed, is extremely
well-known among those who deal with the issue of missing persons in Ireland,
which was confirmed in the discussions the Commission held with individuals and
groups leading to the publication of this Consultation Paper. The 7 year rule
has also been used by the Oireachtas, albeit in a limited context, in section
18 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 and been used as a
reference point for social welfare purposes.[218]
Similarly, it has, in effect, been placed on a statutory footing in Scotland[219]
and Northern Ireland.[220]
3.21
The Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Missing Persons
suggests that a waiting period where death of the missing person is uncertain
should be 7 years “at the most.” This was clearly an attempt to recognise that
the existing laws in the Member States of the Council of Europe contained a
range of waiting times. These range from a fixed term of 5 years in Holland,[221]
Turkey,[222] and
Switzerland,[223] through
the presumptive 7 year rule in Ireland and the United Kingdom and up to 10
years in other countries. The intention of the 2009 Recommendation was that
some median point between these would be appropriate.
3.22
In a number of Council of Europe Member States, the waiting period is
adjusted according to the age of the missing person. For example, in Germany a
declaration of presumed death can be issued after 10 years, or 5 years if that
person is aged 80 or more. This period is extended to 25 years where the
missing person is under the age of 25 at the time of disappearance.[224]
Spain has a similar law which has a standard 10 year waiting period that is
reduced to 5 years if the missing person is 75 or more.[225]
3.23
The Commission
acknowledges that the position in Europe in terms of the waiting periods varies
considerably and that there is no universal or uniform rule in place. Outside
Europe, the position also varies, but in many Common Law states, such as
Australia, the presumptive 7 year rule continues to be applied both by courts
applying the traditional common law rule and also where there has been
legislative intervention. The Commission notes that there is no evidence in the
literature to suggest that this has given rise to injustice; but the Commission
also considers that this result has been achieved in a number of states by a
more flexible approach to waiting periods where death is virtually certain and
can also be attributed to the introduction of legislation to ensure that
interim measures are also put in place almost immediately, such as the
appointment within months of an administrator with limited powers to deal with
the missing persons assets.
3.24
The Commission has also
taken into account that the 7 year presumptive rule has been in place for many
years. Indeed, in the discussion with interested groups leading to the
preparation of this Consultation Paper, the Commission was conscious that the 7
year rule was well-known to those affected by the disappearance of their loved
ones, and is referred to, for example, in the websites of groups working in
this area[226] and of the
Citizens Information Board.[227] The
Commission also notes that the 7 year rule was also recognised by the
Oireachtas in section 18 of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009,
albeit in the limited context of trusts of land.
3.25
The Commission is
conscious that the Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Missing Persons
refers to a waiting period of 7 years “at the most” in connection with
declarations of presumed dead. The Commission notes, in this respect that, in
cases where death is virtually certain, the Commission’s provisional
recommendations for reform provide for a very short waiting period falling well
short of the 7 year period. Where death is highly probable, the Commission
considers that the 7 year period is not unnecessarily lengthy, although as
already noted, the Commission concurs with the approach taken in a number of
other countries, notably Australia and Canada, that any potential unfairness
can be avoided by a more flexible approach to waiting periods where death is virtually
certain. In parallel with this, the Commission also agrees – and has so
recommended already – that, separately from the issue of presumed death,
legislation should be enacted to ensure that interim measures are also put in
place almost immediately, such as the appointment within months of an
administrator with limited powers to deal with the missing persons assets. The
Commission considers that this additional reform would also reflect the
principles in the 2009 Council of Europe Recommendation.
3.26
The Commission has therefore concluded that the common law 7 year rule
be retained as the key reference point for cases involving a missing person
where death is highly probable. The Commission considers in this respect that
the wording used in section 18(5) of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 is an appropriate model in this respect,
namely that where, by reason of absence from the State or otherwise, it
remains uncertain for a period of at least 7 years as to whether a person is
alive, it shall continue to be presumed that the person is dead.
3.27
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in respect of a person
whose disappearance indicates that death is highly probable, and where, by
reason of absence from the State or otherwise, it remains uncertain for a
period of at least 7 years as to whether a person is alive, it shall continue
to be presumed that the person is dead.
3.28
It is clear that those
left behind, and who are therefore affected by the person’s absence, are most
likely to want to bring an application where the missing person disappears in
circumstances that indicate that they may have died. This includes spouses,
civil partners, children, parents, or even close friends of the missing person.
Other parties such as insurance companies, employees, or the State may also
have a legitimate interest in bringing an application to have the missing
person’s estate administered or to have the person declared presumed dead.
3.29
The Commission has
already discussed, in the context of its recommendations concerning the interim
administration of the estate and property of a missing person, who may apply for
such an order. The Commission has also already recommended that the same
persons should also be eligible to apply for a declaration of presumed death.
For the sake of completeness, the Commission sets out here the thrust of that
provisional recommendation as it applies to a declaration of presumed death.
3.30
The Commission provisionally recommends that the following persons
may apply for a declaration of presumed death: (a) the missing person’s spouse
or civil partner; (b) the missing person’s cohabitant; (c) any other next of
kin of the missing person; (d) a creditor; or (e) any other person (including,
where relevant, the State) with a sufficient interest.
3.31
The death of one of the
parties to a marriage has the effect of bringing an end to the marriage, and
the surviving spouse may lawfully remarry.[228]
The same occurs on the death of one party to a civil partnership. Where,
however, a missing person who is declared presumed dead is married or in a
civil partnership at the time of their disappearance, the status of the other
party left behind is more problematic.
3.32
In cases other than
where a coroner issues a declaration of death under section 23 of the Coroners
Act 1962, the remaining spouse or civil partner who wishes to remarry or
form a civil partnership will face a number of problems. In accordance with the
statutory version of the 7 year rule in section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, if the remaining person
wishes to enter into a second marriage, they will not be prosecuted for bigamy
where this is done 7 years after the disappearance, but within that 7 year
period a question might arise. More significantly, whatever about the defence
in criminal law after 7 years absence, it appears that so far as the civil law
is concerned if it is later discovered that the missing spouse was in fact
alive at the time of the second marriage, even where the spouse disappeared in
circumstances which led to a reasonable inference that he or she was dead, the
second marriage is completely void and the marriage to the returned missing
person remains in place.[229] The same
problem arises where a person who is either married or already in a civil
partnership to a missing person enters into a civil partnership with another
person.
3.33
Under the current law,
it might be argued that the remaining party could obtain a divorce on grounds
of separation after four years’ absence of the other party.[230]
It is unclear, however, whether this applies in circumstances where one party
is missing and is believed to have died. In any event, the Commission is of the
view that, given the sensitivities of those left behind in the context of
missing persons, it would not be appropriate to use this mechanism.[231]
Similarly, it would not be appropriate to use the mechanism for dissolution of
a civil partnership in the context of a missing person.[232]
3.34
The law in the England
and Wales has been reformed in light of these problems.[233]
Section 19(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that any
married person who alleges that reasonable grounds exist for supposing that the
other party to the marriage is dead may present a petition to the court to have
it presumed that the other party is dead and to have the marriage dissolved
“and the court may, if satisfied that such reasonable grounds exist, grant a
decree of presumption of death and dissolution of the marriage.” Section 19(3)
of the 1973 Act enacted a statutory version of the 7 year rule by providing
that:
“In
any proceedings under this section the fact that for a period of seven years or
more the other party to the marriage has been continually absent from the
petitioner and the petitioner has no reason to believe that the other party has
been living within that time shall be evidence that the other party is dead
until the contrary is proved.”
3.35
While the statutory
presumption appears to be somewhat different from the common law presumption,
as it is the spouse’s belief which must be reasonable, the usual forms of
proofs must be established to show that the missing spouse had probably died.[234]
3.36
In the case of civil
partnerships, section 55 of the English Civil Partnership Act 2004
allows for a presumption of death order which has the effect of dissolving the
civil partnership.[235] As with
section 19(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the order
provided for in section 55 relates only to the dissolution of the civil
partnership.
3.37
In most other countries
which, unlike England and Wales, have legislation providing exclusively for presumption
of death orders, the making of the order is sufficient to bring to an end any
marriage or civil partnership. For example, this is the case in Northern
Ireland,[236] Scotland[237]
and France.[238] This means
that once the declaration of presumed death is obtained, the missing person is
treated as deceased, and the marriage or civil partnership is at and end.
3.38
The Commission, as
provisionally recommended in Chapter 2, is of the opinion that a presumption of
death order should have all the effects as a standard death certificate. This
would entitle any spouse or civil partner to the widowed or surviving civil partner
social welfare benefit. It would also allow the remaining party to remarry or
enter into a civil partnership should they wish to do so.
3.39
The Commission
provisionally recommends that a declaration of presumed death should have the
effect that a marriage or civil partnership has come to an end.
4
4.01
In this Chapter, the Commission discusses how the law should deal with
the situation where a missing person, in respect of whom an administrator has
been appointed to manage their affairs or in respect of whom a declaration of
presumed death has been made, is in fact alive and returns. This could arise in
the settings in which the missing person had simply wanted to break contact
with his or her family and was unaware that the disappearance had resulted in
the appointment of an administrator or a declaration of presumed death. It
could also arise where fraud was involved, as in the case of John Darwin, the
English man who faked his own death while out canoeing. The Commission also
discusses some of the specific international aspects of the proposed legal
framework.
4.02
In Part B, the Commission discusses how the missing person’s property
can be dealt with through a variation order. In Part C, the Commission
discusses the effect on a marriage or civil partnership. In Part D, the
Commission turns to the specific international aspects of the proposed legal
framework.
4.03
When a person who is
declared presumed dead is subsequently found to be alive, they will usually
wish to regain control of their property. If this property is subject to an
administration order, this would clearly require the removal of the
administration order. However, if the missing person is declared dead or
presumed dead, then as recommended, their assets are subject to the Succession
Act 1965. This provides for the distribution of the assets of the missing
person in accordance with succession law.
4.04
Under the current law,
section 49(3) of the Succession Act 1965 provides that:
“nothing in this section shall prejudice the right of any
creditor or claimant to follow any such assets into the hands of any person who
may have received them.”
4.05
This has the effect of allowing a claimant to acquire property that has
been transferred to third parties, even where the initial transfer was done in
accordance with succession law. The Commission is of the opinion that, as far
as possible, any recommendations regarding the return of property to a missing
person be made in line with section 49(3) of the Succession Act 1965.
The Commission has examined in this respect relevant provisions in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Canada.
4.06
In Northern Ireland, section 5 of the Presumption of Death (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009 provides that a declaration of presumed death may be
varied or revoked by a variation order made by the High Court. Section 6(1) of
the 2009 Act provides that, subject to the specific provisions of the section
itself “a variation order shall have no effect on rights to or in any property
acquired as a result of a declaration [of presumed death].” Section 6(2)
provides that where a variation order has been made the Court making the order
“must make such further order, if any, in relation to any rights to or in any
property acquired as a result of that declaration as it considers reasonable in
all the circumstances of the case.” Section 6(3) of the 2009 Act further states
that the variation order will have no effect on any income accrued between the
time of the issuing of the declaration of presumed death and the variation
order. Section 6(6) provides that if a third party acquires rights to or in the
property, in good faith and for value, the returning person may not bring a claim
for the property against him or her. Finally, section 7 of the 2009 Act
provides that the trustee of the estate is required to take out an insurance
policy in order to provide an indemnity against claims that may arise after the
distribution of the missing person’s assets has occurred.
4.07
These provisions are virtually identical to the Scottish Presumption
of Death (Scotland) Act 1977,[239]
with the exception that section 7 of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act
1977 allows for close family members (parents, children, grandparents and
grandchildren) to make a claim to be exempted from any variation orders.
4.08
The legislation in
Northern Ireland and Scotland is also similar to that in a number of Canadian
provinces. For example in British Columbia, section 5(2) of the Survivorship
and Presumption of Death Act 1996, provides that:
“if a person who is presumed to be dead is found by the court
to be alive, the court may, on the application of any interested person, by
order, give directions the court considers appropriate respecting the property
of the person found to be alive and its preservation and return.”[240]
4.09
This provision grants
the Court discretion to order the reconveyance of the property to the missing
person, which is similar to the variation order procedure in the Northern
Ireland 2009 Act and the Scottish 1977 Act.
4.10
This approach is also
seen in New Brunswick, which provides for a method where the property may be
reconveyed:
“to the owner the whole or a
specified portion of the estate in his possession at the time of the order, or
to pay to the owner a specified amount representing the value of the estate
distributed to him or a portion thereof if, in the opinion of the Court, having
regard to the circumstances of the case, including any inconvenience or
hardship that would be imposed upon the person subject to the order, the making
of such an order would be just.”[241]
4.11
The Commission has
concluded that it is appropriate to provide for a procedure whereby a variation
order regarding property may be brought after the initial declaration of the
missing person as dead or presumed dead. The variation order may be brought by
any person with sufficient interest. This is in line with the current position
in Northern Ireland,[242] Scotland,[243]
New Brunswick[244] and
British Colombia.[245]
4.12
The Commission has
concluded that the general approach taken in the legislation in Northern
Ireland and Scotland should be adopted. This would grant the Court wide
discretion should the returning missing person bring a claim for a variation
order. The Commission is also of the view that the Court, in considering any
applications for a variation order, should have
regard to the circumstances of the case, including any inconvenience or
hardship that would be imposed upon the person subject to the order and whether
the making of such an order would be just in the circumstances. The variation order would not affect
any income accrued from the date of the declaration of presumed death to that
of the variation order. It would also protect third parties who acquire the
property in good faith and for value from potential claims brought against the
property.
4.13
The Commission
provisionally recommends that a missing person who has been declared presumed
dead but who returns may apply to have a variation order made by the High Court
concerning his or her estate. The Commission provisionally recommends that,
subject to the specific provisions concerning the making of such a variation
order, it should not, in general have any effect on rights to or in any
property acquired as a result of a declaration of presumed death. The Commission
provisionally recommends that where a variation order has been made, the Court
must make such further order, if any, in relation to any rights to or in any
property acquired as a result of the declaration of presumed death as it
considers reasonable in all the circumstances. The Commission also
provisionally recommends that: (a) the variation order will have no effect on
any income accrued between the time of the issuing of the declaration of
presumed death and the variation order; and (b) that if a third party acquires
rights to or in the property, in good faith and for value, the returning person
may not bring a claim for the property against him or her.
4.14
As already discussed in
Chapter 3, when a spouse or civil partner dies, their marriage or civil
partnership comes to an end. The other party left behind is then free to enter
into a second marriage or civil partnership, and also becomes entitled, for
example, to the widowed or surviving civil partner social welfare payment. The
provisional recommendation made in Chapter 3 provides that when a missing
person is declared dead or presumed dead all the legal effects of a standard
death arise. This includes that any marriage or civil partnership has come to
an end.[246] Where the
remaining spouse has remarried or entered into a civil partnership in the
incorrect belief that the missing person was declared dead or presumed dead,
the missing person’s return creates a clear difficulty. This Part discusses the
consequences where the marriage or civil partnership of a missing person who is
declared presumed dead is dissolved, and that missing person is subsequently
found to be alive.
4.15
In situations where a
standard death has occurred, there is no question of the spouse being found to
be alive. In such circumstances, the marriage has come to an end, and the
remaining spouse is free to remarry or enter into a civil partnership. Under
the provisional recommendations made in Chapter 3, a declaration of presumed
death ends any pre-existing marriage or civil partnership. However, the
recommendation does not deal with the situation where the missing person is
subsequently found to be alive after the making of the declaration.
4.16
The position in
Northern Ireland where a missing person who is presumed dead and subsequently
returns is that if no appeal is brought within the time allowed or an appeal is
dismissed, the ending of the marriage or civil partnership is final. Section 3
of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009 states:
“the declaration shall be conclusive of the matters contained
in it and shall, without any special form of words, be effective against any
person and for all purposes including the ending of a marriage or civil
partnership...”
4.17
In Scotland, section
3(3) of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977 provides that in situations where a spouse is
declared presumed dead the marriage cannot be reinstated:
“Where a marriage to which the missing person is
a party has been dissolved by virtue of decree in an action of declarator, the
dissolution of the marriage shall not be invalidated by the circumstance that
the missing person was in fact alive at the date specified in the decree as the
date of death.”
4.18
Therefore the legislation in Scotland explicitly forbids any re-opening
of the dissolution of a marriage, even in circumstances where the missing
person who was presumed dead was, in fact, alive. The corresponding provision
in Northern Ireland allows, however, for an appeal to be made concerning the
dissolution of the marriage or civil partnership, if made within the time
period allowed.[247]
4.19
In considering the different approaches to this issue, the Commission
has provisionally concluded that the question of whether a marriage or civil
partnership remains valid if the missing person returns must have regard to the
specific circumstances arising. Given the complexity that this gives rise to,
and having regard to the relevant provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution,
it invites submission as to the precise basis for a determination in such
cases.
4.20
The Commission provisionally recommends that the question of whether
a marriage remains valid if the missing person returns must have regard to the
specific circumstances arising and invites submissions as to the precise basis
for a determination in such cases.
4.21
Broadly similar factors
arise in the context of civil partnership in that under the provisional
recommendations made in Chapter 3 above, a declaration of presumed death brings
to an end any pre-existing civil partnership but does not deal with the situation
where the missing person is subsequently found to be alive.
4.22
As stated, the position
in Northern Ireland where a missing person who is presumed dead and
subsequently returns is that if no appeal is brought within the time allowed or
an appeal is dismissed, the dissolution of the civil partnership is final:
“the declaration shall be conclusive of the matters contained
in it and shall, without any special form of words, be effective against any
person and for all purposes including the ending of a marriage or civil
partnership...”[248]
4.23
This is similar to the
position in England, where section 55 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 makes
provision for the dissolution of a civil partnership where one party has been
presumed dead:
“(1) The court
may, on an application made by a civil partner, make a presumption of death
order if it is satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for supposing that the
other civil partner is dead.
(2) In any
proceedings under this section the fact that—
(a) for a period of 7 years or more the other
civil partner has been continually absent from the applicant, and
(b) the applicant has no reason to believe that
the other civil partner has been living within that time,
is
evidence that the other civil partner is dead until the contrary is proved.”[249]
4.24
This presumption of
death order has the limited effect of dissolving the civil partnership only,[250]
and does not permit a grant of administration. It is also generally not deemed
final until 6 weeks have passed from the date of the declaration of presumed
death,[251] after
which the civil partnership cannot be reinstated at the request of one party.
4.25
Under the current law
in Ireland, unlike in the case of marriage, there is no specific constitutional
reference to civil partnerships. Nonetheless, the Commission has provisionally
concluded that the question of whether a civil partnership remains valid if the
missing person returns must have regard to the specific circumstances arising
and invites submissions as to the precise basis for a determination in such
cases.
4.26
The Commission provisionally recommends that the question of whether
a civil partnership remains valid if the missing person returns must have
regard to the specific circumstances arising and invites submissions as to the
precise basis for a determination in such cases.
4.27
As already noted, missing persons often disappear where their last known
sighting was in a foreign country. In the past, events such as World War II
(1939-1945) have provided examples whereby due to the nature of the events, a
number of declarations of presumed death were required for individuals who
disappeared while abroad.[252] In the
context of increased international travel and patterns of emigration and
immigration in a globalised setting, there is an even more pressing need to
ensure that reform in this area reflects the international nature of some
missing persons cases.[253]
4.28
Similarly in Ireland, the category of missing persons known as “the
Disappeared” provides another element to the international aspect of missing
persons. As already discussed, the Disappeared are a category of missing persons
who were abducted and buried in unmarked secret locations by paramilitary
groups operating in Northern Ireland during the period of violence between the
1970s and late 1990s in particular. At the time of writing (November 2011), 9
of 16 of the remains of the Disappeared have been found.
4.29
Against this particular background in Ireland, it is clear that the
provisions of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009 were
tailored to take account of the need to provide for declarations of presumed
death in respect of those of the Disappeared whose bodies have not been found
(and, given the passage of time, may never be found).
The Commission also notes that this involves a very specific international
dimension to missing persons in Ireland, because it is generally accepted that
at least some of the Disappeared may have been abducted in Northern Ireland but
were buried (and possibly killed) in this State. To date, 7 of the bodies
actually recovered had been buried in this State.
4.30
The international law
aspect of missing persons was recognised in the 1966 ICCS Convention on
Establishing Death (the Athens Convention). As already noted, the 1966
Convention provided for the limited situations in which the person went missing
in a natural disaster or terrorist attack and where death was certain. The 2009
Council of Europe Recommendation on Missing Persons has also recognised the
need to deal with the international dimension to missing persons.
4.31
In Ireland, it is clear that if a person goes missing abroad in
circumstances that indicate that death is virtually certain, a grant of
administration may be obtained in the courts virtually immediately. Thus, in
In the Goods of Freytag,[254]
a declaration of presumed death was made 3 months after Mr Freytag’s
disappearance in the 1908 earthquake in Messina in Italy. A similar recent
example is of the Irish citizen Brendan Donegan who disappeared while
attempting to climb the Peruvian Andes in South America. His wife successfully
applied to the High Court for an order for administration of his estate on the
basis that, although his body had not been found, the evidence in this case was
sufficient to establish that his death was, in the language of the terminology
used in this Consultation Paper, virtually certain.[255]
4.32
The current law is, however, unclear as to the position where a foreign
court issues a declaration of death or presumed death for an Irish citizen who
disappears while abroad. The Commission is of the view that, in such a case,
those left behind should not be at a disadvantage by virtue of the location of
the disappearance.
4.33
The Commission has, therefore, concluded that where an Irish citizen
disappears while abroad an application may be made to the High Court for any of
the orders already provided for in this Consultation Paper, namely (a) an order
for the administration of the missing person’s estate or (b) a declaration of
presumed death. The Commission also provisionally recommends that any such
application should be subject to the same criteria as apply where the person is
presumed to have died in Ireland, and that the High Court may also recognise
any orders made in any other State in connection with the disappearance abroad,
subject to relevant rules concerning proof of foreign documents, including in
accordance with the 1961 Hague Apostille Convention.[256]
4.34
The Commission provisionally recommends that where an Irish citizen
disappears while abroad an application may be made to the High Court for (a) an
order for the administration of the missing person’s estate or (b) a
declaration of presumed death. The Commission also provisionally recommends
that any such application should be subject to the same criteria as apply where
the person is presumed to have died in Ireland, and that the High Court may
also recognise any orders made in any other State in connection with the
disappearance abroad, subject to relevant rules concerning proof of foreign
documents, including in accordance with the 1961 Hague Apostille Convention.
4.35
Comparable, though somewhat different, considerations arise in the
context of a person from abroad who goes missing in this State. In effect, this
involves seeing the case of Mr Freytag or Mr Donegan in reverse. The question
arises as to whether the Italian, or Peruvian, authorities would require, as a
matter of Italian or Peruvian law, that the usual laws that arise after a
death, or presumed death, should be applied to a person who has been in Italy
or Peru for a short time and has disappeared. It is likely that certain aspects
of Italian or Peruvian law would be applicable, notably as to whether an
inquest is required where the person’s body has not been found.
4.36
The frequency and ease
with which persons may now travel across the world means that the problem of
persons disappearing while abroad is a real issue. The prevalence of terrorist
attacks and frequency of natural disasters has also increased in recent times.
For example, the 1985 terrorist attack on a plane flying from Delhi to
Montreal, which involved a detonation and explosion off the coast of Cork,
involved the death of people of many different nationalities (none of whom were
Irish), and led to inquests being held in Ireland. Some of the victims’ bodies
were never recovered from the sea.
4.37
The Commission is aware
that, against this backdrop, non-Irish nationals may disappear while in
Ireland, and thus those left behind may wish to obtain a declaration of
presumed death in Ireland. The Council of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Missing
Persons provides that a presumption of death law should take account of the
following circumstances:
“where the disappearance occurred in
the territory of the State...
where the disappearance occurred during
a voyage of a vessel or aircraft registered in that State;
where the missing person was a national
of that State or was domiciled or resident in its territory;
where the missing person had property
or other financial interest (or obligations) in that State.”[257]
4.38
The relevant
legislation in a number of countries reflects a more narrow approach than
suggested in the Council of Europe 12009 Recommendations. For example, the
legislation in Northern Ireland[258]
and Scotland[259] requires
that the person, in respect of whom the declaration of presumed death is
sought, must be habitually resident or domiciled in the country at the time of
the disappearance. These provisions are widened by permitting a spouse
(or civil partner in Northern Ireland) to make an application if they
themselves are domiciled or habitually resident in the State.[260]
4.39
The Commission considers that the spouse or civil partner should be able
to make an application for a presumption of death for their respective spouse
or civil partner. This would allow for a situation where a person who relocated
to Ireland after their spouse or civil partner disappeared would have the same
recognition had their spouse or civil partner died.
4.40
The Commission also considers that (apart from the issue as to whether
an inquest is to be held) it is appropriate that there be some degree of
connection with the State beyond a short-term visit before the question would
arise as to whether an application should be made to the authorities in that
State for the type of orders already discussed in this Consultation Paper.
4.41
In this respect, the Commission considers that the model adopted in the Presumption
of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009 provides a suitable template for this
State. Section 1(2)(a) of the 2009 Act provides that an application may be made
where the missing person was habitually resident in Northern Ireland for one
year prior to their disappearance and section 1(2)(b) of the 2009 Act provides
that the applicant be habitually resident in Northern Ireland for one year
prior to the application.
4.42
Separately, section1(2)(c) of the 2009 Act provides that an application
may be made by a close relative of a missing person where that missing person
is a victim of violence within the meaning of section 1(4) of the Northern
Ireland (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999. The 1999 Act is the Act
that established the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’
Remains pursuant to the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in order to locate
the bodies of the Disappeared. The equivalent legislation in this State is the Criminal
Justice (Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999.
4.43
The Commission considers that, bearing this specific historical
background in mind, and also that the circumstances in which such applications
are likely to arise would include those connected with the Disappeared, it
would be especially important to ensure that the relevant legislative provisions
should, to the greatest extent possible, be consistent with each other.
4.44
The Commission has, therefore, concluded that in respect of a person who
is ordinarily resident or habitually resident in Northern Ireland for 12 months
or who has been habitually resident or ordinarily resident in this State for 12
months and who disappears while in the State, or is believed to have
disappeared in the State, an application may be made to the High Court by any
interested person who has been habitually resident in the State for 12 months
for any of the orders already provided for in this Consultation Paper, namely:
(a) a declaration of presumed death or (b) an order for the administration of
the missing person’s estate.
4.45
The Commission has also concluded that separate provision should be
included to deal with those described as the Disappeared, and that an
application may also be made for the orders already provided for in this
Consultation Paper by a close relative of a missing person where that missing
person is a victim of violence within the meaning of the Criminal Justice
(Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999.
4.46
The Commission also provisionally recommends that the High Court may
recognise any orders made in any other State in connection with any
disappearance, subject to relevant rules concerning proof of foreign documents,
including in accordance with the 1961 Hague Apostille Convention.
4.47
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in respect of a person
who is ordinarily resident or habitually resident in Northern Ireland for 12
months or who has been habitually resident or ordinarily resident in this State
for 12 months and who disappears while in the State, or is believed to have
disappeared in the State, an application may be made to the High Court by any
interested person who has been habitually resident in the State for 12 months
for any of the orders already provided for in this Consultation Paper, namely:
(a) a declaration of presumed death or (b) an order for the administration of
the missing person’s estate. The Commission provisionally recommends that an
application may also be made for the orders already provided for in this Consultation
Paper by a close relative of a missing person where that missing person is a
victim of violence within the meaning of the Criminal Justice (Location of
Victims’ Remains) Act 1999. The Commission also provisionally recommends that
the High Court may recognise any orders made in any other State in connection
with the disappearance, subject to relevant rules concerning proof of foreign
documents, including in accordance with the 1961 Hague Apostille Convention.
5
The provisional recommendations made by the Commission in this
Consultation Paper are as follows:
5.01
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in the context of any
legislative framework concerning the civil law status of missing persons, a
missing person should be defined as a person who is observed to be missing from
their normal patterns of life, that those who are likely to have heard from
them are unaware of their whereabouts and that the circumstances of their being
missing raises concerns for their safety and well-being. [paragraph
1.17]
5.02
The Commission
provisionally recommends that, for the purpose of the civil law aspects of the
law of missing persons, a statutory framework should be in place which would
provide for a presumption of death in respect of two categories of missing
persons. The first category, where the circumstances of their disappearance
indicates that death is virtually certain, would deal with persons who go
missing in circumstances (whether arising from a civil accident or arising from
a violent incident) where their death is virtually certain given the
circumstances of the disappearance. The second category, where both the
circumstances and length of the disappearance indicate that it is highly
probable that they have died and will not return,
would apply where the disappearance occurred in dangerous circumstances or in
other circumstances in which loss of life may be presumed. [paragraph 1.114]
5.03
The Commission
provisionally recommends that, where a person applies to have a presumption of
death order, the following detailed list of matters should be included in a
sworn affidavit:
1. The date when the
supposed deceased was last heard from.
2. Specific evidence
tending to indicate that the individual is dead, such as:
(a) the circumstances surrounding the disappearance,
(b) lack of communication with people who were likely to hear
from him or her, including last known correspondence or communication, and
(c) the length of time since disappearance.
3. Except in
exceptional circumstances, the applicant should advertise for information
concerning the whereabouts of the supposed deceased.
4. Where possible,
the applicant should arrange for search-and-rescue authorities to confirm, by
way of affidavit if possible, that attempts were made to locate the individual,
but were fruitless.
5. The applicant
should set out the full background relating to the disappearance, including the
background as to the supposed deceased’s age and health (including mental
health).
6. The applicant
should also arrange for the details to be corroborated as much as possible by a
family member.
7. The applicant’s affidavit
should set out the next-of-kin entitled to distribution of his assets on his
death. 8. The applicant must aver their belief that the individual is dead.
[paragraph 1.115]
5.04
The Commission also
provisionally recommends that, in determining whether a presumption of death is
to be ordered, all the circumstances surrounding the disappearance must be
taken into account, including the following:
(a) the time, location, and
circumstances of the disappearance
(b) the extent and nature of
post-disappearance searches
(c) a prior history of fraud
(d) the presence or absence of a motive
for the missing person to remain alive but disappear
(e) the time between a life insurance
policy being obtained and the subsequent disappearance
(f) facts suggesting the disappearance
was a consequence of foul play and
(g) abandonment of valuable property.
[paragraph 1.116]
5.05
The Commission
provisionally recommends that it would be appropriate to include provision in
the proposed mental capacity legislation for limited administration of the
property of a missing person, in particular in circumstances in which it could
not be established that a presumption of death order could be made. The
Commission also provisionally recommends that, pending the enactment of mental
capacity legislation, an application to appoint an administrator to manage the
affairs of a missing person, amounting to a limited grant of administration of
the estate, could be made to the Probate Office. An applicant would furnish the
necessary documentation to the Probate Office, who would then decide whether an
administrator should be appointed, subject to an appeal to the High Court. [paragraph 1.126]
5.06
The Commission provisionally recommends that an order to appoint an
administrator to administer a missing person’s property may only be made where:
(a) it is not known whether the person is alive; (b) reasonable efforts have
been made to find the person; and (c) for at least 90 days, the person has not
contacted (i) anyone who lives at the person’s last-known home address or (ii)
any relative or friend of the person with whom the person is likely to
communicate. [paragraph 2.43]
5.07
The Commission provisionally recommends that the following persons may
apply to be appointed as the administrator of the estate or property of a
missing person: (a) the missing person’s spouse or civil partner; (b) the
missing person’s cohabitant; (c) any other next of kin of the missing person;
(d) a creditor or (e) any other person (including, where relevant, the State)
with a sufficient interest. The Commission provisionally recommends that this
should also be the list of persons who may apply for a declaration of presumed
death. [paragraph 2.54]
5.08
The Commission provisionally recommends that an administrator have
limited and specified powers to administer the affairs of the missing person
for a period of up to two years, which can be extended for a further two years.
[paragraph 2.58]
5.09
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in situations where death
is virtually certain, there should be no minimum waiting period before an
application can be made to obtain a declaration of presumed death. The
Commission also provisionally recommends that this declaration could be made by
a coroner and would be identical to a standard declaration of death; that it
would authorise the applicant to register the death in the Register of Deaths
provided for under the Civil Registration Act 2004; and that it would
have the identical legal consequences that arise on the death of a person. [paragraph 3.14]
5.10
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in situations where death
is highly probable, a declaration of presumed death may be made in the High
Court; that the declaration would authorise the applicant to register the death
in a Register of Presumed Deaths to be established for this purpose under the Civil
Registration Act 2004; and that it would have the identical legal consequences
that arise on the death of a person. [paragraph 3.19]
5.11
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in respect of a person
whose disappearance indicates that death is highly probable, and where, by
reason of absence from the State or otherwise, it remains uncertain for a
period of at least 7 years as to whether a person is alive, it shall continue
to be presumed that the person is dead. [paragraph
3.27]
5.12
The Commission provisionally recommends that the following persons may
apply for a declaration of presumed death: (a) the missing person’s spouse or
civil partner; (b) the missing person’s cohabitant; (c) any other next of kin
of the missing person; (d) a creditor; or (e) any other person (including,
where relevant, the State) with a sufficient interest. [paragraph
3.30]
5.13
The Commission
provisionally recommends that a declaration of presumed death should have the
effect that a marriage or civil partnership has come to an end. [paragraph 3.39]
5.14
The Commission
provisionally recommends that a missing person who has been declared presumed
dead but who returns may apply to have a variation order made by the High Court
concerning his or her estate. The Commission provisionally recommends that,
subject to the specific provisions concerning the making of such a variation
order, it should not, in general have any effect on rights to or in any
property acquired as a result of a declaration of presumed death. The
Commission provisionally recommends that where a variation order has been made,
the Court must make such further order, if any, in relation to any rights to or
in any property acquired as a result of the declaration of presumed death as it
considers reasonable in all the circumstances. The Commission also
provisionally recommends that: (a) the variation order will have no effect on
any income accrued between the time of the issuing of the declaration of
presumed death and the variation order; and (b) that if a third party acquires
rights to or in the property, in good faith and for value, the returning person
may not bring a claim for the property against him or her. [paragraph 4.13]
5.15
The Commission provisionally recommends that the question of whether a
marriage remains valid if the missing person returns must have regard to the
specific circumstances arising and invites submissions as to the precise basis
for a determination in such cases. [paragraph 4.20]
5.16
The Commission provisionally recommends that the question of whether a
civil partnership remains valid if the missing person returns must have regard
to the specific circumstances arising and invites submissions as to the precise
basis for a determination in such cases. [paragraph 4.26]
5.17
The Commission provisionally recommends that where an Irish citizen
disappears while abroad an application may be made to the High Court for (a) an
order for the administration of the missing person’s estate or (b) a
declaration of presumed death. The Commission also provisionally recommends
that any such application should be subject to the same criteria as apply where
the person is presumed to have died in Ireland, and that the High Court may
also recognise any orders made in any other State in connection with the
disappearance abroad, subject to relevant rules concerning proof of foreign
documents, including in accordance with the 1961 Hague Apostille Convention. [paragraph 4.34]
5.18
The Commission provisionally recommends that, in respect of a person who
is ordinarily resident or habitually resident in Northern Ireland for 12 months
or who has been habitually resident or ordinarily resident in this State for 12
months and who disappears while in the State, or is believed to have
disappeared in the State, an application may be made to the High Court by any
interested person who has been habitually resident in the State for 12 months
for any of the orders already provided for in this Consultation Paper, namely:
(a) a declaration of presumed death or (b) an order for the administration of
the missing person’s estate. The Commission provisionally recommends that an
application may also be made for the orders already provided for in this
Consultation Paper by a close relative of a missing person where that missing
person is a victim of violence within the meaning of the Criminal Justice
(Location of Victims’ Remains) Act 1999. The Commission also provisionally
recommends that the High Court may also recognise any orders made in any other
State in connection with the disappearance, subject to relevant rules
concerning proof of foreign documents, including in accordance with the 1961
Hague Apostille Convention. [paragraph 4.47]
[1] Report on Third
Programme of Law Reform 2008-2014 (LRC 86-2007), Project 37.
[2] The Commission does
not, therefore, consider in this Consultation Paper any criminal law aspects of
the law of missing persons, such as the existence of specific protocols and
procedures for notifying missing persons to the Garda Síochána Missing Persons
Bureau (established in 1982), or international co-operation and mutual
assistance between police forces through Europol or Interpol. These issues were
dealt with comprehensively in the 2009 Report of the Garda Síochána
Inspectorate, Missing Persons Review and Recommendations (2009),
available at www.garda.ie. Nor does the Consultation Paper deal with criminal
procedure matters such as that a prosecution for the murder of a missing person
may proceed in the absence of a body (the corpus delicti), provided
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that death has
occurred: see The People (Attorney General) v Thomas [1954] IR 319 and
The People (DPP) v Towson [1978] ILRM 122.
[3] Source: Garda
Síochána Missing Persons Bureau, available at
www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=85&Lang=1 (last accessed 28 November
2011).
[4] Report
of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Missing Persons Review and
Recommendations (2009), p.21, available at www.garda.ie.
[5] Source: Garda
Missing Persons Bureau, available at
http://www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=85&Lang=1.
[6] Available
at http://www.missingpersons.ie/.
[7] James,
Anderson and Putt, Missing Persons in Australia (Australian Institute of
Criminology, 2008) at 15.
[8] Holmes Living in
Limbo: The Experiences of, and Impacts on, the Families of Missing People (London:
Missing People, 2008) at 11, available at www.missingpeople.org.uk.
[9] The Child
Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991 regulates the
international civil law aspect of this area of missing, abducted, children.
[10] See the discussion
in Chapter 1, below.
[11] See the discussion
in Chapter 1, below.
[12] See the discussion
in Chapter 1, below.
[13] As discussed in
Chapter 1, below, seven of the Disappeared currently (November 2011) remain
unaccounted for.
[14] The Presumption
of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009, discussed in detail in the
Consultation Paper, includes specific provision for the families of the
Disappeared: see in particular Chapter 4.
[15] Supporting Families of Missing People: Existing Provisions and the
Missing Persons Taskforce Recommendations (UK
Houses of Parliament All-Party Parliamentary Group for Runaway and Missing
Children and Adults, 2011) at 4.
[16] Holmes Living
in Limbo: The Experiences of, and Impacts on, the Families of Missing People (London:
Missing People, 2008) at 17.
[17] See Boss
“Ambiguous Loss: Working with Families of the Missing” (2002) 41 Family
Process 14-17, and Boss, “Ambiguous Loss in Families of the Missing” The
Lancet Vol 360, December 2002, at 39-40.
[18] Wayland, Supporting
Those who are Left Behind: A Counselling Framework to
Support Families of Missing Persons (Australian Federal Police National
Missing Persons Coordination Centre, 2007) at 8.
[19] See the discussion
of section 18 of the 2009 Act in Chapter 1, below.
[20] Holmes Living
in Limbo: The Experiences of, and Impacts on, the Families of Missing People (London:
Missing People, 2008) at 32.
[21] Biehal, Mitchell
and Wade, Lost from View (The Policy Press, 2003) at 45.
[22] [1961] IR 219,
discussed below.
[23] Cummins, Without
Trace – Ireland’s Missing (Gill & Macmillan, 2010) at 231.
[24] See DPP v
Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 and Report on Inchoate Offences (LRC
99-2010), paragraphs 2.44-2.47.
[25] The inquest was
held under section 15 of the English Coroners Act 1988, which is broadly
similar to section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962, both discussed below.
[26] See R v Darwin [2009]
EWCA 860, in which the English Court of Appeal examined in detail the
background to what it described as a “notorious” case.
[27] Oxford,
“Suzy Lamplugh ‘declared dead’ by her family” The Independent 28 July
1993. Her parents also established the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, which
promotes general personal safety and which also led to the inauguration in
England of a national personal safety day. Many workplace-based policies on
lone working are also often referred to as “Suzy Lamplugh policies.”
[28] Both
the 1977 and 2001 incidents were discussed in the Meeting of the Council of
Europe Working Party on Missing Persons (5-7 November 2008), paragraph 6,
available at www.coe.org. The Working Party’s deliberations led to the Council
of Europe 2009 Recommendation on Missing Persons, discussed below.
[29] Holmes, Living
in Limbo: The Experiences of, and Impacts on, the Families of Missing People (London:
Missing People, 2008) at 16.
[30] Cohen, McCormick
and Plecas, A Review of the Nature and Extent of Uncleared Missing Persons
Cases in British Columbia (School of Criminology and Criminal Justice,
University College of the Fraser Valley, British Columbia, 2008) at 1-2.
[31] James,
Anderson and Putt, Missing Persons in Australia (2007) at 4.
[32] Guidance on the Management Recording and Investigation of
Missing Persons (English Association of Chief Police Officers, 2005) at
paragraph 1.1.
[33] See O’Halloran,
“Daughter tells of pain over missing mother” Irish Examiner 23 February
2011.
[34] The 2000 Report
of the Coroners Review Group is available at www.justice.ie.
[35] The Commission has
drawn on the detailed discussion of the common law rule and relevant case law
in Ireland contained in Power “Body of Evidence,” Gazette, Law Society of
Ireland, April 2004, p.18.
[36] Report on the Reform and
Modernisation of Land Law and Conveyancing Law (LRC 74-2005).
[37] Guidelines
to Area Managers and Inspectors: Widow's/Widower's Pensions (Contributory and
Non-Contributory) (October 2008), available at
www.welfare.ie/EN/OperationalGuidelines/Pages/swi_widorph.aspx.
[38] (1869)
IR 5 Eq 1.
[39] Ibid at 12.
[40] The headnote to
the case ((1869) IR 5 Eq 1, at 1) refers to the Court “following the analogy of
the Statute (7 W.3, c.8, s.1)” and this is the only specific reference in the
case to section 1 of the Life
Estates Act 1695. It
is notable that Chatterton V-C referred to “the Statutes” so he may also have
had in mind the 7 year rule in the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861.
[41] [1961]
IR 219.
[42] Ibid at 222.
[43]
Ibid.
[44] (1909)
42 ILTR 116.
[45] (1902)
36 ILTR 173.
[46] “Wife
of dead climber granted probate order” The Irish Times 5 May 2000.
[47] (1909)
42 ILTR 116.
[48] See the discussion
in Chapter 2 below of the specific provisions enacted in this respect in
English law.
[49] Power “Body of
Evidence,” Gazette, Law Society of Ireland, April 2004, 18, at 21.
[50]
Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2009) 12 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles Concerning Missing
Persons and the Presumption of Death (9 December 2009).
[51]
United Nations Conference on Declaration of Death of Missing
Persons, Lake Success New York, March - April 1950.
[52]
United Nations Convention on the Declaration of Death of
Missing Persons, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 1/9.
[53]
Article 1(1) of the 1950 UN Convention.
[54]
Friedmann “Declarations of Death – A New International
Convention” (1950) 25 St. John’s Law Review 18, at 25.
[55] ICCS Convention on Establishing Death,
ICCS Convention No 10 (1966) (the
Athens Convention).
[56]
Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2009) 12 of the
Committee of Ministers on Principles Concerning Missing Persons and the
Presumption of Death (9 December 2009), available at www.coe.org.
[57]
Article 1 of the ICCS Convention on Establishing Death, ICCS
Convention No 10 (1966).
[58]
Council of Europe Draft Recommendation CM/Rec (2008) 8 of the
Committee of Experts on Family Law Working Party on Missing Persons (5-7
November 2008) at paragraph 6.
[59]
Ibid at paragraph 7.
[60]
Ibid.
[61]
Principle 1, Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2009)
12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles Concerning
Missing Persons and the Presumption of Death (9 December 2009).
[62] Section
5A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[63] Absentees Act 1990.
[64] See O'Halloran,
“Family glad of closure at inquest into ‘disappeared’” Belfast Telegraph,
22 September 2011 (inquest into death of two “Disappeared” whose bodies had
been recovered).
[65] Department
of Finance and Personnel, Missing Persons A Consultation by the Department
of Finance and Personnel on the Draft Presumption of Death Bill (Northern
Ireland) 2008 (January 2008), Foreword, at ii.
[66] Department
of Finance and Personnel, Missing Persons A Consultation by the Department
of Finance and Personnel on the Draft Presumption of Death Bill (Northern
Ireland) 2008 (January 2008).
[67] Department of
Finance and Personnel, Presumption of Death Bill (Northern Ireland) 2008
Report on Consultation (May 2008).
[68] Department
of Finance and Personnel, Missing Persons A Consultation by the Department
of Finance and Personnel on the Draft Presumption of Death Bill (Northern
Ireland) 2008 (January 2008) at 31.
[69] Ibid at paragraphs 7-8.
[70] See R v Darwin [2009]
EWCA 860.
[71] “When is a missing
person declared dead?”, BBC News Magazine, 5 December
2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7128867.stm.
[72] [1953]
1 WLR 1323.
[73] [1956]
P 259. See also Bayes-Walker v Bayes-Walker [2010]
EWHC 3142 (Ch).
[74] (1869)
IR 5 Eq 1.
[75] Parliamentary
Inquiry Session Two Resolving a Missing Person’s Practical Affairs: Presumption
of Death (All-Party Parliamentary Group for Runaway and Missing Children
and Adults 2011), 12.
[76] See Inquiry:
Support for Families of Missing People Report with Recommendations
(All-Party Parliamentary Group For Runaway and Missing Children and Adults
2011), 21.
[77] (1937)
59 CLR 395.
[78] Ibid at 405.
[79] [2006]
QSC 250.
[80] [2009]
SASC 176.
[81] Ibid at paragraphs 20 - 23.
[82] Section
54 of the Trustee and Guardian Act 2009.
[83] Section
5A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[84] Section
8AA of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991.
[85] The Government
Legislation Programme Autumn Session 2011, available at www.taoiseach.ie,
proposes to publish a Mental Capacity Bill in early 2012. This would implement
the thrust of the recommendations in the Commission’s Report on Vulnerable
Adults and the Law (LRC 74-2006) which included recommendations to enact
legislation comparable to the adult guardianship legislation already in place
in, for example, Australia and Canada.
[86] Section 60(AB)(2) Guardianship and Administration Act 1986. A
virtually identical provision is contained in section 54(2) of the NSW
Trustee and Guardianship Act 2009 and section 8AA of the Guardianship
and Management of Property Act 1991.
[87] Section
60(AE) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[88] Rosewall (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT
1994.
[89] Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, Newfoundland & Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and
British Colombia.
[90] Section
2(1) of the Manitoba Presumption of Death Act 1988. This section
is mirrored in: section 15(3) of the Missing Persons and Presumption of
Death Act (2009) (Saskatchewan); section 2(1) of the Presumption of
Death Act (1974) (New Brunswick); section 3(1) of the Presumption of
Death Act (1996) (Newfoundland and Labrador); section 3(1) of the Presumption
of Death Act (1989) (Nova Scotia); and section 3(1) of the Survivorship
and Presumption of Death Act (British Columbia).
[91] [2007]
BCJ No. 1573.
[92] [2004]
BCJ No. 73.
[93] Ibid at paragraphs 24 - 27.
[94] Ibid at paragraph 35 (Crawford J.).
[95] [2006]
BCJ No. 2703.
[96] Re Schmidt, 12 BCLR (2d) 186 (Court
of Appeal).
[97] Re
Cyr [2006] BCJ No. 2703, at paragraph 2.
[98] Section
2(5) of the Declaration of Death Act 2002.
[99] [1996]
92 OAC 19.
[100] Ibid at paragraph 9.
[101]
Ibid at paragraphs 8 - 10.
[102]
Ibid at paragraph 11.
[103] Ibid at paragraph 14.
[104] Section 94(1) of
the Surrogate Rules Alta Reg 130 (1995).
[105]
[2010] AJ No. 1008.
[106] Ibid at paragraph 58.
[107]
[2008] ABQB 487.
[108] Absentees Act 1990.
[109] Articles 84-102 of the Quebec Civil Code and section 3(1) of the Presumption
of Death Act 1974 (New Brunswick).
[110] Re Taylor [1925]
27 OWN 497.
[111] Section 1 of the Absentees Act 1990. Article 84 of
the Quebec Civil Code has a similar broad provision: “An absentee is a person who,
while he had his domicile in Québec, ceased to appear there without advising
anyone, and of whom it is unknown whether he is still alive.”
[112] (1909) 42 ILTR 116, discussed above.
[113] Power “Body of
Evidence,” Gazette, Law Society of Ireland, April 2004, 18, at 21.
[114]
[2010] AJ No. 1008.
[115] Ibid at paragraph 58.
[116] Payne,
“Understanding ‘Going Missing’: issues for social work and social services” British
Journal of Social Work (1995) 25(3) at 343-344.
[117] Howard, Protecting the Estates of Missing Persons – A submission
to the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s Review and Administration Act 1986
(Vic), 14 May 2010, 9.
[118] Holmes, Living
in Limbo: The Experiences of, and Impacts on, the Families of Missing People (London:
Missing People, 2008).
[119] Available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/hampshire/7859110.stm.
[120]
Available at
http://lauthmissingpersons.com/blog/2011/03/parliamentary-law-review-for-relatives-of-missing/.
[121] The Government
Legislation Programme Autumn Session 2011, available at www.taoiseach.ie,
proposes to publish a Mental Capacity Bill in early 2012. This would implement
the thrust of the recommendations in the Commission’s Report on Vulnerable
Adults and the Law (LRC 74-2006) which included recommendations to enact
legislation comparable to the adult guardianship legislation already in place
in, for example, Australia and Canada.
[122] Section 54 of the Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (New South
Wales); Section 5A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Victoria);
Section 8AA of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (Australian
Capital Territory).
[123] Articles 84-102 of the Quebec Civil Code; Absentees Act 1990 (Ontario);
section 3(1) of the Presumption of Death Act 1974 (New Brunswick).
[124] Section 54 of the Trustee and Guardian Act 2009.
[125] Section 5A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[126] Section 8AA of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act
1991.
[127] The Government
Legislation Programme Autumn Session 2011, available at www.taoiseach.ie,
proposes to publish a Mental Capacity Bill in early 2012. This would implement
the thrust of the recommendations in the Commission’s Report on Vulnerable
Adults and the Law (LRC 74-2006) which included recommendations to enact
legislation comparable to the adult guardianship legislation already in place
in, for example, Australia and Canada.
[128]
Re Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 at paragraph 5.
[129]
Re Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 at paragraph 6.
[130]
Ibid.
[131] A similar
provision is contained in the section 54(2) NSW Trustee and Guardianship Act
2009 and section 8AA of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act
1991 Australian Capital Territory.
[132]
Re Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 at paragraph 6.
[133]
Ibid at paragraph 9.
[134] Section 54(4) of
the Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 permits the submission of evidence by
an applicant when making the application for the appointment of an
administrator “in such form and in accordance with such procedures as the Court
thinks fit.”
[135] [2005] NSWSC 566.
[136] [2005] NSWSC 560.
[137]
Ibid at paragraph 15.
[138] [2005] NSWSC 566.
[139]
Ibid at paragraph 10.
[140]
Ibid.
[141]
Re Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 at paragraph 12.
[142]
Re Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 at paragraph 13.
[143] Section 60AB(1) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 Victoria.
Also see section 54(2) NSW Trustee and Guardianship Act 2009 and section
8AA(1) of the Guardianship and Management of
Property Act 1991 Australian Capital Territory.
[144] Section 8AA(1)(d) of the Guardianship and Management of Property
Act 1991 Australian Capital Territory.
[145] For example, see
section 47(1) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 Victoria.
[146] Section 44 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 Victoria.
See also section 72 of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 Australian
Capital Territory.
[147]
Re Gell [2005] NSWSC 566 at paragraph 30.
[148] Section 60AE of
the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 Victoria; section 8AC(4) of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act
1991 Australian Capital Territory.
[149] Section 8AC(1) of the Guardian and Management of Property Act
1991 Australian Capital Territory; sections 57 and 67 of the NSW Trustee
and Guardian Act 2009.
[150] Section 56 of
the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009; section 8AA(4) of the Guardian
and Management of Property Act 1991 Australian Capital Territory; section
48(1) of the Guardian and Administration Act 1986 Victoria.
[151]
Section 4(2) of the Guardianship
and Management of Property Act 1991 Australian Capital Territory.
[152]
Section 60AB Guardian and Administration Act 1986 Victoria. Also see
section 56(a) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 which states
that the guardian must exercise “all functions necessary and incidental to its
[the estate’s] management and care.”
[153] Re Gell [2005] NSWSC at
paragraph 16.
[154]
Section 60AB Guardian and Administration Act 1986 Victoria. Also see
sections 59 and 65 of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009.
[155]
Section 60AD(1) of the Guardianship and
Administration Act 1986 Victoria; sections 91 and 93 of the NSW Trustee
and Guardianship Act 2009; sections 29 and 30(A) of the Guardianship and
Management of Property Act 1991 Australian Capital Territory.
[156] Rosewall (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT
1994.
[157] Mr. Rosewall’s car was
subsequently found abandoned and despite an extensive search, he had not been located
at the time of the hearing.
[158] Ibid at paragraph 30.
[159] Rosewall (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT
1994 at paragraph 9.
[160]
Ibid.
[161]
Ibid at paragraphs 30 – 31.
[162]
Rosewall (Guardianship) [2010] VCAT 1994.
[163]
Ibid at paragraph 40.
[164] Absentees Act 1990.
[165] Articles 84-102 of the Quebec Civil Code. See
also section 3(1) of the Presumption of Death Act 1974 (New Brunswick).
[166] Re Taylor [1925]
27 OWN 497.
[167] Article 87 of
the Quebec Civil Code.
[168] Section 2 of the Absentees Act 1990. See also Graham,
“The Absentees Act: It Could Happen to You” 12(4) (2008) The Probater.
[169] Kamboj v Kamboj (2007) CanLII 14932
(Ontario SC) at paragraph 20.
[170] Section 1 of the Absentees Act 1990. Article 84 of
the Quebec Civil Code has a similar broad provision: “An absentee is a person
who, while he had his domicile in Québec, ceased to appear there without
advising anyone, and of whom it is unknown whether he is still alive.”
[171] McCarthy (1923)
OLR 482 at paragraph [10].
[172] (2007) CanLII 14932 (Ontario
SC).
[173] Ibid at paragraph 35.
[174] Kamboj v Kamboj (2007) CanLII 14932
(Ontario SC) at paragraph 37.
[175] (2008) Ontario
Superior Court of Justice, Ct. File No. 05-42/0.
[176] Ibid at paragraph 6.
[177] Section 3 of the
Absentees Act 1990 and article 90 of the Quebec Civil Code.
[178] Section 60(AE) Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[179] (2007) CanLII 14932 (Ontario SC).
[180] Section 60(AE) Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[181]
Article 87 of the Quebec Civil Code.
[182] Re Doherty [1961] IR 219 at 222.
[183] Committee of
Experts on Family Law, Study On Missing Persons, Presumption of Death and
Commorientes Following, In particular, terrorist attacks and natural disasters(Strasbourg
20th November 2007) at 12 – 13.
[184] Section 1(2)(b)(i) of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland)
Act 2009.
[185] Section 1(3) of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act
2009.
[186] Section 1(2)(b)(ii) of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland)
Act 2009 also allows a “close relative” of the a member of the
‘Disappeared’ to bring a presumption of death application.
[187] Sections 1(3)(i) and 1(5) of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act
1977.
[188] Section 2(1)(d) of the Presumption of Death Act (New Brunswick) 1974.
[189] Article 92 of
the Quebec Civil Code.
[190] See section
29(2) of the State Property Act 1954.
[191] Section 1 of the Declaration of Death Act 2002 (Ontario).
[192] Section 60(AE) Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.
[193] Section 65 of
the NSW Trustees and Guardianship Act 2009 (NSW).Similar provisions are
contained in section 8(AA) of the Guardianship and Management of Property
Act 1991 (ACT), and section 49 of the Guardianship and Administration
Act 1986 (Victoria).
[194] Article 88 of
the Quebec Civil Code.
[195] Section 6 of the Absentees Act 1990. Also see section
32(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act 1992.
[196]
Section 10(1) of the Succession Act 1965.
See Keating, Keating on Probate 3rded (Thomson Round Hall
2007) at page 225 at paragraph [15-01].
[197] That is, unless
section 23 of the Coroners Act 1962, discussed in Chapter 1, applies.
[198] See the
discussion in Chapter 1, above.
[199] (1909) 42 ILTR 116, discussed in Chapter 1, above.
[200] See the discussion
in Chapter 1, above, of the 2009 Act and of the guidelines published by the
Department of Social Protection concerning the widow’s and widower’s benefit.
[201] Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977.
[202] Presumption of Death (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009.
[203] Sections 4-7 of the Verschollenheitsgesetz 1939.
[204] Sections 3(1)-(2) of the Verschollenheitsgesetz 1939.
[205] Section 2(1.7)(a) of the New York State Code.
[206] Section 53(9)(1) of the Georgia State Code.
[207] Department of Finance and Personnel, Missing Persons A
Consultation by the Department of Finance and Personnel on the Draft
Presumption of Death Bill (Northern Ireland) 2008, (January 2008) at
paragraph 40.
[208] Principle 4 of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2009)
12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles Concerning
Missing Persons and the Presumption of Death (9 December 2009).
[209] (1909) 42 ILTR 116, discussed in Chapter 1, above.
[210] (1909) 42 ILTR 116, discussed in Chapter 1, above.
[211] Article 1:426
Dutch Civil Code. See also Chorus et
al, Introduction to Dutch Law (Kluwer Law International
2006), at 101.
[212] Section 2(1)(a) of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act
2009.
[213] See paragraph
1.115, above.
[214] See paragraph
1.116, above.
[215] The Commission
notes that, in Scotland, all declarations of presumed death are entered on the
Register for Births, Deaths and Marriages.
[216] See paragraph
1.115, above.
[217] See paragraph
1.116, above.
[218] See the
discussion in Chapter 1, above, of the 2009 Act and of the guidelines published
by the Department of Social Protection concerning the widow’s and widower’s
benefit.
[219] Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977.
[220] Presumption of Death (Northern
Ireland) Act 2009.
[221] Dutch Civil
Code, Article 1:413 (1) and (2).
[222] Turkish Civil
Code, Article 32.
[223]
Swiss Civil Code, Article 35.
[224]
Verschollenheitsgesetz (1939), Article 3:1-2.
[225] Spanish Civil
Code, Articles 193-198.
[226]
See www.missingpersons.ie.
[227] See
www.citizensinformation.ie.
[228] Cretney, Principles
of Family Law 4th ed (Sweet &
Maxwell 1984) at 223.
[229] See Lowe and
Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law 10th ed (Oxford 2007) at 1087,
and Breslauer, “Foreign Presumptions and Declarations of Death and English
Private International Law”, 10 MLR 122, at 135-136.
[230] Section 5 of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1995.
[231] The Commission
notes that section 4(1)(c) of the Canadian Divorce
Act 1985 allows for one party to obtain a divorce if they have no knowledge
of the whereabouts of the other party for three years.
[232] Section 110 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act
2010.
[233] See Lowe and
Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law 10th ed
(Oxford 2007) at 1087.
[234] See Lowe and
Douglas, Bromley’s Family Law 10th ed
(Oxford 2007) at 1088. See Parkinson v Parkinson [1939] P 414, where it
was held that the petitioner must provide evidence to show that the missing
spouse had died, and Tweney v Tweney [1946] P 180, in which both the
spouse and her second husband had carried out extensive enquiries as to the
whereabouts of the spouse’s first husband.
[235] Section 68 of the English Civil Partnership Act 2004 states
that the order is conditional at first. The waiting period before this
order is made conclusive is six weeks, unless otherwise provided for by the
Lord Chancellor.
[236] Section 3 of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act
2009.
[237] Section 3(1) of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977.
[238]
Article 88 of the French Civil Code.
[239] Sections 5 and 6 of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977.
[240] Section 5(2) of
the Survivorship and Presumption of Death Act 1996.
[241] Section 6(2) of the Presumption of Death Act (New Brunswick)
1974.
[242]
Section 5(1)-(2) of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009.
[243]
Section 4(1) of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act
1977.
[244] Section 5(2) of the Survivorship
and Presumption of Death Act 1996.
[245] Section 6(2) of the Presumption of Death Act (New Brunswick)
1974.
[246] See paragraph
3.39, above.
[247] Section 3 of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act
2009.
[248] Section 3 of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act
2009.
[249] Section 55 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.
[250] Section 161(c)(1) of the Civil
Partnership Act 2004.
[251] Section 161(2) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004.
This may, however, be shortened by the Court in its discretion.
[252] Freidmann
“Declarations of Death – A New International Convention” (1950-51) 25 St.
John’s Law Review 18.
[253] Council of
Europe, Meeting of the Committee of Experts on Family Law Working Party on
Missing Persons (26-28 September 2007) at paragraphs 10-11.
[254] (1909) 42 ILTR 116, discussed in Chapter 1, above.
[255] “Wife of dead
climber granted probate order” The Irish Times 5 May 2000.
[256] The Commission
discussed the 1961 Hague Convention, commonly known as the Apostille
Convention, in detail in its Report on the Hague Convention on Abolishing
the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (LRC 48-1995)
and more generally in its Report on Aspects of Intercountry Adoption (LRC
89-2008), at paragraphs 4.18-4.20.
[257] Principle 2 of the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2009)
12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles Concerning
Missing Persons and the Presumption of Death (9 December 2009).
[258] Section 1(2)(a) The Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act 2009.
[259] Section 1(3)(a) The Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977.
[260] Section 1(2)(b) of the Presumption of Death (Northern Ireland) Act
2009 and section1(3)(b) of the Presumption of Death (Scotland) Act 1977.